Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1981

Plyler v. Doe
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Immigration Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Plyler v. Doe. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 558/Folder 29-31 & 559/1-6. Powell Papers. Lewis
F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

St~tes ~cpart~cnt

United

--

Itm~igrntion nnd

.111-~D

REQUIRED TO DEPART BY DISTrriCT

Total
deported and
requi-red to

Deported

clcpart

u.s.

TOTAL

}q

0q

~

,;J,J..SJ.
'g (.,

/ r;!

~ ()
~3P

I'+ 7

~

I
S' I '7
q I I

t '"f :J
I .t:::: r.
IS' 3

14 d.,:,

-- --- - -- ·--- - ~ ~ '+l:f 2
9&.

J..RS
."??

!. q .'P
S:J. 7~
II ct ~

f'l"<
9

'd-33d.

~ s;> I
~-'1 4- ()

.

{.
~

"'
.s·

'< .,

IS t: t..

-~··

':l

yJ

'C" 4{

.

.

~

---

4.~':?

I

(. 9 ()
kP ..

~ct4

~~('3P ·

.~ 'I c:;
I 3 ('

<.......

~'-1ft.

E-"t-4-fo&

... '7 I
7C,49

/1

0 (_

.:?6:;
d ") 71"1

f-' .3

:'.l

7.5.3S'

~I

~/to 0

4£'X'7

71(,

.S?
'?R'(,
t::"-9 'Jq

•

"~'

S" I L./ &../

.'?S3
r"'] I S3
J. ('"

..

~

iti"'i:- ----,_-f-/ J ~ r_
.s

~~ -~~

.

- - - ___..,. _ -· - ------- .

/7

.

:J.t:I?SS'

I

~

~ 0

~G,~q

I

1'7~5>

,

.}. .t::' I I

l)?q9.::.JQ

I .

0

;;

.s c;"

~9?

~"'
7 q~"'

L.

'7~

L.f '1 I
I S' I I

~

'

r1

4 ?9

I. C.,' qL

,,.. , 'JC,-,

.,)

~

·- . -··

9?7

.J/

.)
d

WESTERN R'EG!ONI..J.ri,O,C,/t..
, :J ~ I "J
Honolulu, lla\.laii
Los An~clcs Calif·.
1<../C,(,.,?
(, (., I....J. "'f !,'
Phoenix t'\riz.
San F~ancisco, C&llif.
3~?S"
(+IJ 1\t'L._a
C. ft./ 1/?'. 'S4- .1:\ I C

s

s-od

~r

I0 ~ I

- ·--- -

-~~' ~

I o Cf 3

~~ -

-

1 /., '?,J

.:..'707

'?k:7

-~ 0 ~

J o. ? t.

4"_o~

~-

/7~~7
/ _ifc '7

~~q

~00

.

719~

s;:;,..

.:J '1 71_
GIAt
I o 7 _'J

/9 ~~
J... c:-p 4-

....-

-· z. (,

'i ;)_

/j

U

'-{1/-"

-rt::f
~!r~)
(

/'7d..t.3

/'-f S'3

"

NORTHERN REGION
Anchorage, Alaska
Chica~o. Ill.
Clc·.,.,elanc, O~io
Denver, Colo.
Detroit Mich.
Helena. Mont.
Kansas City. Ho
Omaha Neb.
Portland, OreS!.
S.t. Pnul. Hinn.
Seattle. Wash.

./\

depart

.

'73~~?"1

F..ASTERN REGION
Baltimore r1d.
Boston , Ma ss.
Buffa lo , N.Y.
Har t ford, Conn.
l~e"~>r ark, N.J.
New York 2 1;. Y.
Philadelohia Pa.
Portland. Me.'
St. Albans, Vt.
San Juan P.R.
'Washim;ton,
D.C.
.. .
SOUTHERN REGION
Atlanta, Ga.
Dallas., Tx.
El Paso, ·Tx.
Har_lingen, Tx~
Houston, Tx.
Miami,Fla·.
New Orleans, La • .
San Antonio, Tx.

··--- - ·-·- ·- · ··--·

)tA1

FISCAL YEA~ l~o ,

Districts

.

1·~~

Wachington, D.C.

ALIEJ\S D£POI;.TED

/

11~~

of Justice

t:aturnl b .ntion Service

4.).). 7??
I ~c 4
/'-fJS/
-~ (. 3 >:- .~'

.3'+

gq

33 7331

.

.

-

.

May 1, 1981
Court . . . . . . . . . . . . :--:--: . . . . .

Voted on .....~ ........... , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No. 80-1538

PLYLER
vs.

DOE

HOLD
FOR

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l.'

CERT.
G

D

N

Burger, Ch. J .......... .

0

POST

v

•••

0

DIS

•••••••

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF·

MOTION
G

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

0

Brennan, J ........................... .

-/
../
.............. /

Stewart, J ........................... .

•

White, J ........................... .
Marshall, J .......................... .

0

•••••••••••

0

0

••

;,. ............ ..

Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J ........................... .

" . /' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '

Rehnquist, J .......... ..
Stevens, J ............. .
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

0

••••••••••

0

0

•

0

0

0.

0.

0

•

0.

0

••

0.

0

••

0

••••••••••••••••••••

0

•••••

0

••

0

••

•••

0

••

0

••

0

p~

!9-.e- c ~- ~- ~JIWI$-* ~ ~
~~~d-1~
~~~

~~~~~-2 ~

~~~~-r ~~

g-IY -1 s- ~ <;~~ ./ f).,._e_.
go~ !f'3tr r~di--z..-

1/'

~

r-L4~~(~1-)}

ar.~~

~4'~~~~\
~~-fh.> ~~~ - ~,~nzs~s
~

~

"'

~ $~

,...

tZ--uk

.

~j<-~-

TL~~~§//~W.~l
C/ls'

j,tt.tJ)

~ ~ ~ ~~~

E/f1~~- ~~~~~~
r~Jt /~~~
I. ~f~

(~. lL:_,_,;

~~q.

_,

.91--~

~ ~ ~u- ~ ~~~~if-~~,,~~

--t<.

~

-'-..e.

~ ~ ~l::zu_~

~vj~'t;u/~~~
~~~tLo~.) LTI.-U~
( / ~)~ ~~-~~~ ~ ~ tB'7u
~)~~H~ .
~~~

~~

"'*' ,Az( • · -Y-?:t-~~ ~ F--

~~~ : ~~4~~~
~~c~o~/~)h~,~

~ ~ . (s..J:UL J . .ife~ ~ ~ ~
w~J(~f117) .

v

P{f/~:
~

v

~(U.t?f~~- W~fj)

~~~~~~~

~~~H~~~~
~.r~~~~~

~~~·(~12.-1&>)

~-~~d-~~

~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~
da •••t1 I .,.Q~1-eJ. . ~ J
~~
trf~,nu:/dL4¥-~~? ~

~~~~~~~
~~-

JI
!>~~

~

~M~~~kJ
~~f~~~~~

-~~~~~~~~~-

5~~~~4~~
~

,

..

a~~k-v{

~

.
~~~,s~

~r-~ ~aa~ ~~tz,_u._

~J3u_::f- ~

~

4

V'-

~~ ~

~~ ~ ~-v ~ .,;::1-

~i..o~~~~~
~~~~~u~~·
~ ~.

~~~~~

~~4A~~

I

~s:G-: ~~""L.J,

c~~¥?~~~~
~~~~ ~~lr.(~~zsj
~~v-j ~~~i{)~

~~~~~~) .
~~~~~~~
~~~~~J.s 1-tJ ~~ rto..._
s~~~~ ~~~1-4"12~

~44~~~~

••

1"L,

~ ~~ It~

k-;

~ ~6--t ~ ~~.~~,1.~

~9

""

.

~

~~

c~s- ~ £/!!'~~ ~
..

~ dAf2.;p~J ~

-I~

~I

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 1, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 80-1538
PLYER (Superintendent)
ET AL

~ from

~k

=...:::..:..:~

CAS (Dyer,
Johnson and Politz)

v

DOE ET AL
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

The appellants challenge the ruling of the two courts

below invalidating, as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, a
Texas statute which prohibits the use of state funds to

~ducate

children who are not "legally admitted" to the United States.
FACTS:

-

alien

The appellees are a class of schoolage children who have

been denied a free public education by the appellants pursuant to a

-

this action under 42

u.s.c.

2 -

1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act,

§

challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

They also attacked

the tuition policy of the Tyler Independent School District (TISD),
whereby the district charges a tuition of $1,000 per year for each
undocumented child as a prerequisite to enrollment in the Tyler public
schools.
On September 14, 1978, the district court granted the appellees'
request for permanent injunctive relief, after a trial on the merits.
The district court held that

21.031 and the TISD tuition policy

§

violate the Equal Protection Clause and, alternatively, that the
statute and the policy infringe upon an area that is pre-empted by
federal law.
DECISION BELOW:

CAS affirmed the holding of the district court

that the Texas statute and the TISD tuition policy violate the Equal
Protection Clause.

- -------

It did not agree with the alternative holding of

the district court that the statute and the policy infringe upon an
area pre-empted by federal law.
On the Equal Protection issue (the only challenge relevant here),
CAS noted that it is undisputed that the Fourteenth Amendment extends

11due process protections" to aliens, even if they are in the country
'---

~-

C""""

Shaughn~ssy

illegally.

.....

-

v United States, 34S U.S. 206.

Similarly, it

J

is clear that aliens legally residing in the United States are given
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.
441 U.S. 68.

See, Ambach v Norwich,

Whet er aliens illegally residing in the country are

''E

entitled to su n protection has never been squarely decided by the
Court, however.
CAS concluded that the Equal Protection Clause does extend to such
illigal aliens.

They are clearly "persons within the jurisdiction" of

the state in which they reside and thus fall within its plain language.
Moreover, while never holding that the Equal Protection Clause extends

- 3 -

to illegal aliens, the Court has indicated that the clause affords such
aliens the equal protection of the laws.
163

u.s.

See Wong Wing v United States

228, 238, quoting Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369.

And,

finally, logic compels the conclusion that illegal aliens come under
the mantle of the Clause.

To hold otherwise would be to disable courts

from invalidating a state statute that established the maximum penalty
for theft at 10 years if committed by a citizen or legal alien, but at
50 years if committed by an illegal alien.
CAS proceeded to discuss the appropriate level of scrutiny.

Though

it felt that the statutory classification may be deserving of strict
judicial scrutiny, CAS found it unnecessary to resolve the issue.
panel concluded that the statute

isA~hether

The

tested using the

mere rational basis standard or some more stringent test.
Texas clothes its statute in economic phraseology: in order to
protect the education of documented children and citizens, it must
decrease or avoid increasing the total cost of education: to reach
this result, Texas excludes undocumented children from its free public
schools.

CAS rejected this justification.

In the court's view, to

accept it would mean that cost, in and of itself, could justify the
exclusion of any group of people from any government program that
requires funding.

This, clearly, is not the law.

The other justifications offered by Texas are equally unpersuasive.
Texas may not argue that well-educated aliens will leave Texas, because
it does not have the right to confine the long-term benefits of its
public education program to its borders.

The record does not support

the contention that illegal aliens spread disease.

And, finally, the

failure of Texas to pass measures directly designed to discourage entry
of illegal aliens (such as bans on employment) casts serious doubt on
its claim that its motive in passing the statute was exclusionary.
CONTENTIONS:

The appellants contend that aliens who enter the

- 4 -

-

country illegally are not "persons within a state's jurisdiction" for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.
meaning when illegal aliens are involved.
cannot be legally "within" a state.

The word "within" has unique
Anyone who enters illegally

According to the appellants, case

after case stands for the proposition that lawful entry is a necessity
if any rights other than due process rights are to apply.
Blake v McClung, 172 U.S. 239

They cite to

(treating citizenship of corporations).

The appellants aver that to apply the Equal Protection Clause to
undocumented aliens would confer a right that would not be available
were they not in this country.

This would be bootstrapping of the

worst sort and would encourage aliens to enter the country illegally.
..
~
.
The appellants close b y c1t1ng
Mathews v D1az,
426 U.S. 67, 8 0 ,

wherein the Court upheld the right of Congress to condition medicare
"-...

._-.

I

on five years' residence and admission for permanent resident status.
Amici

(Texas school districts)

in support of the appellants say

that the Texas statute inquestion does not contain any classification
in terms of alienage or citizenship, nor any classification between
legal and illegal aliens.

The statute distinguishes between residents,

whether citizens or aliens, and non-residents, whether citizens or
aliens.

The Court has made clear that a state may treat residents and

non-residents differently in affording free tuition within its schools.
Vlandis v Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445, 452-53, 453-54.

Thus, according to

amici, the real question in the case is whether Texas is forbidden to
treat illegal aliens as non-residents of a school district.

Clearly,

it may so treat them.
The appellees respond that, while this Court has never ruled that
undocumented aliens are protected by the Equal Protection Clause, the
clear language of that provision, this Court's rulings on the Due
Process Clause, and simple logic command the conclusion that they are
protected.

The principle that basic protections adhere to all who are

- s physically within the jurisdiction of a state has been repeated in many
rulings of the Court.

See, Carlisle v United States, 16 Wall 147, 1S4;

Johnson v Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763; Kleindienst v Mandel, 408 u.s. 7S3
And, in Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 u.s. 3S6, 369, the Court expressly said
that the term "persons within the jurisdiction" applies to all within
the territorial confines of a state.
DISCUSSION:

It should be noted that the appellants' Jurisdictional

Statement fails to comply with Rule lS(l) (j) (iv) because a

~ opy

of the

Notice of Appeal is not appended to it.

--------------------~
In separate litigation, a statewide challenge to

§

21.031 resulted

in a ruling by a second district court that the statute violates the
Equal Protection Clause.

That court enjoined the State of Texas from

denying free public education to any child due to the child's status
as an undocumented alien.

CAS stayed the injunction without opinion,

/

and Justice Powell vacated the stay.

Certain Named and Unnamed Non

Citizen Children and Their Parents v Texas, 101 s.ct. 12.

In doing

so, Justice Powell noted that the case presented a difficult question
of constitutional significance and that it was reasonable to assume
that the Court would note probable jurisdiction.
CAS's opinion in this case seems well rooted in the decisions of
this Court, and there is no conflict in the circuits.

Indeed, in

Bolanos v Kiley, S09 F2d 1023, CA2 expressed the view that the Equal
Protection Clause does apply to illegal aliens (dicta).
Appellants' argument that it is illogical to require the states to
grant educational benefits to illegal aliens when they are not bound
to provide an education for aliens residing in their native countries
is flawed, because it ignores a jurisdictional predicate of the Equal
Protection Clause.

Similarly, the appellants' argument that it is

illogical to allow the federal government to deny the benefits of its
social programs to illegal aliens, Diaz, supra, while disallowing the

- 6 states from similarly denying the benefits of their programs is also
flawed.

The same lack of symmetry exists with regard to legal aliens,

Graham v Richardson, 403

u.s.

36S, and it reflects no more than the

fact that the federal government has plenary power to regulate
immigration -- and the states do not.
Where CAS's opinion is open to challenge is in its
the justifications.

If, as CAS was willing to assume

rational basis standard is appropriate, CAS's weighi
state interests may be incorrect.

In the more

-----

higher standard of review is appropriate where
~

of

of the various
event that a

state completely

bars (as opposed to the more limited ~ rtial ~ r in San Antonio School
Board v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1) minimal education for the appellee
children, however, CAS's conclusion would seem to be correct.
It is undeniable that this is an important issue.

The Court could

choose to affirm CAS's opinion, but it may be more desirable to afford
this case plenary review.
There is a response and one amici brief.

4/22/81

Sexton

Opinion in Petition

dfl 11/25/81

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

November 25, 1981

David

No. 80-1538:

Plyler v. Doe

No. 80-1934:

Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented
Alien Children

Question Presented
Whether
authority over
exclude

the

equal

protection

clause

and

federal

immigration permit Texas school districts

illegal

public education?

alien

children

from

the

benefit of

a

to

free

z.

I.

Introduction and Summary

This is an unusually difficult case without a clear
answer.
or

The Court can write a principled opinion either for

against

the

children,

on

either

preemption or equal protection.

of

I say,

the

two

questions--

"principled," but in

fact the opinion will be exceedingly difficult to write either _1 ~~

You

will

not

be

surprised

that

I

argue

in

the

memorandum for a preemption approach, but I do so with great
diffidence.

I will argue that because of the complexities and

uncertainties
impossible

of

for

the
the

immigration

State

to

system,

determine

it

that

is

virtually

someone

is

a

deportable alien until there has been a finding to this effect
by

the

INS.

The

Texas

scheme

permits--indeed

forces--the

school systems to make predictions about whether or not the
INS

will

ultimately

deportable.

conclude

that

certain

individuals

are

The State may guess wrong, and in any event it is

no business of the states to determine an individual's status
under the immigration laws.

Certainly the federal government

occupies the field to this degree.

Also, there is evidence in

the record that some of these children may not be deportable
under

federal

law,

indeed may be citizens,

are unable to obtain documentation.
1

is

based

upon

\'

documentation,

the

even though they

Because the Texas scheme ~~
exclusion

of

any

04

such ~~ ·

children may conflict with federal law, assuming that federal

~

- ~~

~~

.)

.

law treats such nondeportable persons as permanent residents.
In addition,

it can be argued that Congress has so

occupied the field of immigration,

that any state regulation

based on alienage without express authorization from Congress
is preempted.
by the Court

Although

this approach was seemingly rejected

in De Canas v.

Bica,

u.s.

424

351

(1976),

the

Court may wish to limit De Canas to its particular facts.
If
might

the Court takes a preemption approac 4 Jcongress

respond

to

the decision

by authorizing

the

states

to~
~Lf

treat illegal aliens as if deportable until the INS found to
the

con~ary. ~It

aliens

any

preemption

state

might also authorize the states to deny such
benefits.

problem,

but

argument would remain:
to

the

would

stronger

remove

form

of

to

treat

different ways.

may

the

of

the

preemption

---------,.

prohibit

illegal
Also,

part

The constitutional
provision of power
.....__

federal government to establish a

naturalization"
states

a

That

Congress

aliens

as

"uniform system of

from

they

authorizing

please

were Congress to respond

and

the

in

50

in this way

the equal protection question would need to be faced.
In addition Texas could make the preemption argument
somewhat more difficult by revising its statute.

Ironically,

if the statute were less generous it might be less subject to

l..v!;V
Y,~
~

(

question.

That

education to all

_..- __ state

to

decide

~specific cla~ses

is,

if

the

statute

did

not

extend

a

free

~~ns--thus requiring the
who
of

is

and

aliens

~~~ ~·IJ.A.•A/ ~oPo
A.J
·~Y~- ;~~r:;v ~ ~

~~~~~~tftYf.

who

is not

permitted

lawful--but only
to

stay

~

to

indefinitely

~

. -z •

under federal law, the scheme might be less subject to attack.
But if the argument that Congress has occupied the field is
convincing, and if De Canas can be limited, then absent some
explicit congressional authorization, even this scheme would
be preempted.

And

again

the

Court would have

to consider

whether Congress could constitutionally permit the states to
discriminate ,against aliens if they chose to do so or whether
the "uniformity" clause would still prohibit such distinctions
at the state level.
short,

In
preemption

argument:

written ) forces
derogation of

there
1)

are

that

three

the

versions

Texas

scheme

of
as

the

it

is

the state to determine immigration status in
the

exclusive

authority of

the

Ci"»

INS~

~

the

~ ~~migration is o~ :;~c;z~~

~aliens

must be treated as citizens. unless Congress explicitly

authorizes the states to draw
Article

I

power

"to

distinctions~

establish

a

3)

~

the Congress'

uniform

rule

of

naturalization" requires that the regulation of aliens be done
at the national level and Congress may not permit the states
to draw distinctions
might

go

their

based on alienage for

separate

ways.

I

think

then the states
that

the

first ~'$'

preemption ar ument settles this particular case but that the
Court would be wise
second

,..___..____

-

of

these

to cut back on De Canas and adopt the

preemptio ~

arguments.

Admittedly,

in

the

short run, the result of adopting such a preemption argument
will

be

sweeping.

But

Congress

may

respond

by

direct

~

.J •

regulation and possibly by authorizing the states to impose
their

own

restrictions

if

the

"uniformity"

language

in

the

naturalization clause is not a bar.
The difficulties with an equal protection approach
are twofold. ~ even to make the equal protection
----...
argument the Court has to make an argument very similar to
that which I make under the guise of preemption.

That is, a

necessary threshhold step to any equal protection analysis is
li

to find that illegal aliens are domiciliaries of the state. If
the illegal alien children are not domiciliaries, Texas has no
¥~ .)) more
obligation to educate them than citizens of New Mexico.
2
/.fr
,.-,.rr- · Thus, the first step in an equal protection analysis is for

~

l/

vr.P

~

the

Court

to

the

states

that

they must

treat

illegal

)

aliens as if they are domiciled in the state. The states may

~~reasonably
~r-~
~

tell

reply that it is absurd to treat persons as having

frt-" an intent to reside permanently who may not form such an

~ ;t

intent as a matter of federal law. The answer is that federal

~- _ pw is not so clear as this.

~
~

·

~:rmitted
the

Some of these aliens will be

to stay on, others will never be challenged. Because

states

are

unable

to

know

which

of

the

aliens

will

ultimately be deported and which will be permitted to stay by
default or permission, they must treat them as domiciliaries,
assuming that the aliens have established a residence in the
state.

5..L~

like

the

preemption

protection approach will have sweeping

approach,
implications

an

equal ~~f1

for

the

~

6

0

.,.

~
treatment

of

benefits.

illegal

Indeed,

------

aliens

if

the

with
Court

does

... ~~ ~,~~-v:.

to

all

state ~----

reach

the

equal

respect

protection question, I do not see how it can avoid concluding
that

It

illegal

aliens

are

every

bit

as

much

sus ~ ~t

a

\\

classification as resident aliens.
that

resident

The inevitable result of

Graham 1 s

holding

because

discrete and insular is the conclusion that

aliens are similarly suspect.

aliens

are

a

If the Court

suspect

class

illegal ~

is unhappy with

that conclusion, it is because the premise is wrong.

:::::::~
~4-(_

Of course, just as in the resident alien cases, one
would assume
would

that a holding that

not detract

from

the

illegal aliens are suspect

federal government 1 s

unfettered power over all classes of aliens.
preemption

approach,

an

equal

essentially

Just as with the

~ction

ultimately require Congress to legislate directly.
question will
states

to

arise

place

whether

will

approach

::::.

Again the

Congress may merely permit

restrictions

on

aliens

or

whether

the

it must

directly do so on its own authority.
In
approaches

sum,
are

preemption

strikingly

similar.

~

)J

sweeping
whether

the

potential.
the

fede ral

Both

require

government

may

and

Both
the

possible.

facts

here

a

limited

have

a

rather ~

Court--t-o--c-o_n_s- ider ~

transfer

authority to regulate aliens to the states.
particular

protectio~

equal

some

of

its

Perhaps on the

preemption

decision

That may be attractive in the short run.

is

7.

II.

Equal Protection

A.

Are

Illegal

Aliens

"Persons"

Under

the

14th

Amendment?

By

its

terms

the

Fourteenth Amendment applies
United States, 163 U.S. 228
Fourteenth

Amendment's

equal

protection

to "persons."

clause

of

the

In Wong Wing v.

(1896), the Court stated that the

due

process

and

equal

protection

provisions "are universal in their application to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction."

The Court has held that

the due process component of the Amendment applies to illegal
aliens, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345

u.s.

206 (1953), and there is no apparent reason to treat the scope
of the equal protection clause differently in this respect.
On the other

hand,

it

is

true

that

the Court has

been careful in recent years not to include illegal aliens in
~

its decisions affecting lawful resident aliens.
Diaz,

426 U.S.

67,

80

In Mathews v.

(1976) , Justice Stevens remarked that

"Neither the overnight visitor •.• nor the illegal entrant can
advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a

share

in

the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to
its own citizens and some of its guests."
648 F. 2d 432

(CAS 1981),

In Boe v. Wright,

Judges Reavley and Clark,

through

means of a lengthy concurrence, took the occasion of that case
to register

their disapproval of the panel's decision in Doe

v.

Plyler.

Judge Reavley made note of

consistent
'person'

and
as

Fourteenth

careful

used

in

language
the

Amendment

equal

"the Supreme Court's

indicating

that

protection

clause

'encompasses

lawfully

L./1- ()"

term ~

the
of

the

~·

admitted

aliens ••• '"
Yet could it seriously be argued that a state could
exclude,

for

example,

illegal Mexican aliens from a benefit

program but extend the program to illegal aliens from France?
If the equal protection clause has no application then such
national

origin discrimination--even

rae ial discrimination--

among illegal aliens might be permissible. In light of such a
shocking

result,

and

Fourteenth Amendment,

given

the

-----

language

of

the

I conclude that aliens are included in
-----------~

the equal protection clause.

-

They are "persons" within the

jurisdiction of the State of Texas.

B.

plain

II

)/~

Is the Texas Scheme Rational?

1. the decision below

The CAS found that the exclusion of illegal aliens C /-1
from

the

public

rational
____.... basis
Texas'
system.

interest

schools

could

standard of
in

keeping

not

review.
down

be

First,
the

justified

under

a ~~
I-t>~

the CA considered

costs

s---

of

the

j~. ~

~~

school ~

TheCA held that such a justification could never

itself justify an exclusion from a government benefit 1 :

~

by ~~

~ 5~
~CA-

Footnote{s) 1 will appear on following pages.

9.

Texas strongly urges that decreasing its costs is a
r ational
justification
for
Section 21.031.
To
accept this contention would mean that cost, in and
of itself, could justify the exclusion of any group
of people from any government program that requires
funding.
This is clearly not the case.
United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 u.s. 528
(1973) •••• We think it clear that a state's desire
to save money cannot be the basis o "f--ffi e t o tal
excluSTon ~ tr om e u
sc oo_ s of a group 0
persons
who ar eienTft led to the equal protection of the laws
of Texas and who share similar characteristics with
included children."

Second,

the

CA

considered

Texas'

assertion

c/-t~

that

unlike other students, illegal alien students would not return
the benefit of their education to the community through their
employment--the better educated an illegal alien becomes, the
'--"'

more

likely

could

not

he

is

seek

to

education

it

border."

Such a

to

be

deported.

"confine

provides

the

to either

The CA held

long-term
its

border

that Texas

benefits
or

the

of

the

national

purpose would be unconstitutional while

if

Texas did seek such an end "it chose a grossly underinclusive
means."
Third,

Texas argued

that the exclusion of illegal

1 The district court had held as a matter of fact that

1

~c /~~~

1

t~e e !,£lusi ~ gal alie ns-w~uld not save the school
ru~
d1str~ cts s~oney or raise th e q u al1 t y of education for the ~
other s t udents :- The CA found that the answer to this fact ~ ~- ~
question was irrelevant:
"Our decision today would be no
~ ~ .
different if Texas could conclusively porve that excluding ~~~
undocumented children from its schools raised the quality of
/A- . .
(
education available to citizens and legal aliens."
v~ ~)

10.

alien children was justifiable for reasons of public health.
The

CA

properly

gave

short

shrift

to

this

justification.

Finally, the State argued that the exclusion of illegal alien
children would tend to discourage illegal immigration into the
United States and into Texas in particular.

The CA found that

such a goal might be constitutional, even commendable, but the
CA doubted that this was in fact one of Texas' purposes.

If

Texas genuinely wished to deter immigration it would enact a
law making it illegal to hire an illegal alien.

This it had

not done, casting "serious doubt on its exclusionary motive."
Moreover,

the

district

court

had

found

that

the

education
exclusion was not effective in discouraging immigration. 2

2 In a footnote the CA disposed of the State's additional
arguments: (1) that the illegal children have special needs that
drain the school's resources, (2) that the school districts are
unable to project the number of illegal children in the future
and so are unable to plan, and (3) that illegal aliens do not pay
their share of taxes. The CA found that the State's inability to
plan for illegals did not justify exclusion; that illegal
children were no more expensive to educate than many of the legal
children and that the federal government paid for the special
programs anyway; and finally that no state may condition
educational benefits on the amount of taxes paid by the parents.
The district court in Doe v. Plyler distinguished De
vCanas v. Bica in which the Court upheld California's ban on the ~
employment of illgal aliens. ~ Although that decision was based
solely on preemption, never mentioning equal protection, one
~~
could infer that the De Canas Court implicitly believed that the ~
California scheme was rational. Judge Justice argued that in the ~~
context of 'employment ''it was rational to use ac lassification
_:-;;~
jrL
oaseo upon illegal alienage. Illegal aliens, because they are
~~
:A~
i
, accep em oyment at substandard conditions and wages. ~11
~~ .,
en the state seeks to regulate these conditions and wages it is jJ
fi.~
· ~~ional to ban the employment of illegal aliens because it is
~
~ e fact of ~his status that creates the problem the state would
~
-~
~·
Footnote continued on next page.

2
~~--~ -.

~~~~~~~

11.

</1~5 ~ l-1.-~'
/. d-~ ~ ~;,.·~.e..:l

~~
2.

.

critique of the CAS · · ~ '-t-~~~~~-

2

~~~~
I am not at all persuaded by the CAS's reasoning for
two

reasons.

~ a State may restrict its benefits to

domiciliar ies

~~

the

State.

It

is

not

at

all

clear

that

illegal aliens may under either federal or state law have an

~0 n tent

~.)'

of

to

reside

permanently

. significant this point is:

in

any

~

State.

just how

~n

are

~ suspect class, unless th~ be said to be domiciled in

fo

-------

F

the state, Texas would have no more obligation to educate them
than

--------------------~~~----------------------

it

would

a

group

of

black

Arizonans.

And e~-~ if

illegal aliens may be domiciled in the state, there are
significant

difference

between

them

and

all

rather ~
/~~

other ~

domiciliaries that justifies as rational the State's decision ~
to

limit

its

educational

resources

to

citizens

and

legal~

residents.

a.

~

are illegals domiciliaries?

Surely a State need not educate persons who are not
domiciliaries of the State.
educate

a

child who

lives

We would not say that Texas must
two miles

across

the New Mexico

solve. But the children are not more difficult or expensive to
educate because they are illegal.

border but who prefers the Texas schools.
with

a

State

welfare

program,

we

If we were dealing

would

not

unemployed citizen of Argentina could fly
welfare,

say

that

to Texas,

and fly home the following week.

an

request

Quite simply no

State has an obligation to provide its benefits to persons who
.
~----------------------------------------------are not domiciliaries of the state simply because they present
themselves to the State.
The Court has recognized this principle repeatedly
and in an essentially similar context.
435

u.s.

647

(1978),

In Elkins v. Moreno,

the Court examined whether

a class of

legally admitted nonimmigrant aliens were entitled to free or
lower "in-state" tuition to the University of Maryland.

The

"'----=---~

aliens

were

employees
United

the

children

of

G-IV

international

Nations.

The

permanently

aliens--"officers,

organizations"

University

nonimmigrant aliens could
reside

of

took

the

such

in Maryland"

and

as

position

not have "the requisite

or
the
that

intent to

therefore could

not

be

Maryland domiciliaries.
The
immigration
intent

to

Elkins

law

the

reside

Court
children

found
of

permanently

G-IV
even

that
aliens

under
could

though

federal
have

they

nonimmigrant aliens:
"Although nonimmigrant aliens can generally be
viewed as temporary visitors to the United States,
the nonimmigrant classification is by no means
homogeneous with respect to the terms on which a
nonimmigrant enters the United States. For example,
Congress expressly conditioned admission for some
purposes on an intent not to abandon a foreign

an

were

~.

residence or, by implication, on an intent not to
seek domicile in the United Staes •.. By including
restrictions on intent in the definition of some
nonimmigrant
classes, Congress must have meant
aliens to be barred from these classes if their real
purpose in coming to the United States was to
immigrate permanently.
[I]t is also clear that
Congress
intended
that,
in the absence of an
adjustment
of
status
... ,
nonimmigrants
in
restricted classes who sought to establish domicile
would be deported.
But
Congress
did
not
restrict
every
nonimmigrant class.
In particular, no restrictions
on a nonimmigrant's intent were placed on aliens
admitted under
[G-IV].
Under
present law,
therefore, were a G-4 alien to develop a subjective
intent to stay indefinitely in the United States, he
would be able o o s
thout violating either the
1952 Act, the Service's regulations, or the terms of
his visa."

-

Thus, there was no reason in federal law why the G~

IV aliens could not have an intent to reside permanently.

But

the Court did not conclude that these aliens were

therefore

domiciled

benefits.

in

the

state

and

entitled

to

state

Whether the aliens were then domiciliaries of Maryland, was a
question of State law, and the Court certified this question
to

the

Court

of

Appeals

of

Maryland. 3

The

rather

clear

implication of the certified question was that the State could
conclude that G-4 aliens were not domiciles of the State, and

3 The certified question was the following:
"Are persons
residing in Maryland who hold or are named in a visa under [G-4
of the immigration act], or who are financially dependent upon a
person holding or named in such a visa, incapable as a matter of
state law of becoming domiciliaries of Maryland?"

14.

I

could deny them the benefit of in-state tuition.
But
classes

of

excluded
state,

I

certainly
I

legally

from

lower

')

if

admitted
tuition

G-IV

aliens,

nonimmigrant
because

not

the states must be able to treat

4
nondomiciles.
_______........

or

indeed

other

aliens,

may

be

domiciled

in

the

illegal aliens as

Indeed, one might argue that as a matter of

federal law the states may not treat illegal aliens as having
an intent to reside permanently. 5 At the least the state

~- ~
~
.. ~
1 \
h~~

~~- -

'I

4The Maryland court in fact did find that G-IV aliens
could be domiciled but it noted that "If under federal law a
particular individual must leave this country at a certain date, ~ ·
or cannot remain here indefinitely, then he could not become
domiciled in Maryland. Any purported intent to live here
~
indefinitely would be inconsistent with law. It would at most be
an unrealistic subjective intent, which is insufficient under
Maryland law to establish domicile."
Following decision by the Maryland court, the
University changed its regulation. It took the position that
even if the G-4 aliens were domiciliaries the University would
still not permit them to register at the lower tuition. Cert has
been granted to decide whether the state may exclude such aliens.
Toll v. Moreno, No. 80-2178. The fi t question in the cert
petit'on is whether G-4 aliens a e-a s sect class.
In ElK1ns t e Court did not decide wne er federal law
might preempt the state from treating a class of aliens as
domiciliaries: "Petitioner has argued •.. that, if as a matter
of federal law a nonimmigrant alien is required to maintain a
permanent residence abroad or must state that he will leave the
United States at a certain future date, then such an alien's
subjective intent to reside permanently or indefinitely in a
State would not create the sort of intent needed to acquire
domicile. It is not clear whether this argument is based on an
understanding of the common law of Maryland defining intent or
whethr it is based on an argument that federal law creates a
'legal disability,' ••• which States are bound to recognize under
the Supremacy Clause .••• In any case, w~ need not decide the
effect of a federal law restricting nonf:mmigran F a TDe ns
s u ated above, s1nce it is clear that Congress did not require
G-4 aliens to maintain a permanent residence abroad or to pledge
Footnote continued on next page.

should be permitted to find that as a matter of state law a
person who is subject to deportation and who is in the state
illegally may not form an intent to reside there permanently.
Any other

result would

lead

to the anomaly that a legally

admitted but nonresident alien could only become domiciled-and thus entitled to state benefits--when he violated his visa
and became an illegal alien.
On the other hand, I think one can make the argument
t7 ... A

~~:

fl::

~----------

II

that the state must treat illegal aliens as domiciled in the
~ , althoug'-h-..._t_h. .e-.._
. a_r_g_u..,m._e_n.. _t--r-u.._n~
s-s_o_m_e_..w..__h_a__t _ .c._o_ u_n_t_e r to the

¥{ J;.s

~~ approach

in Elkins.

Note again that unless the argument can

~
~

be made that illegal aliens must be treated as domiciliaries,

~

~

the whole of the equal protection analysis-- be it low or high
level scrutiny--will avail the children nothing.

If the Texas

7-4~
~f

~1-

scheme simply distinguishes residents from nonresidents, and
is not a classification based on alienage,

~

permissible.

~~~

The
distinguish

~l!.t-

then it

Elkins
G-IV

Court

aliens

from

went
other

to

great

sorts

of

lengths

to ~
~~

nonimmigrant~~

aliens who are required to maintain a domicile elsewhere.

But

the Court also noted that in addition to being able to develop
an

intent

to

reside

permanently,

these

aliens

might

be

permitted to stay on in the country even if they lost their G-

to leave the United States at a date certain."

435

u.s.

663-664.

16.

IV status:
"Of
course
should
a G-4
alien terminate his
employment
with
an
international
treaty
organization, both he and his family would lose
their G-4 status.
Nonetheless, such an alien
would not necessaril be ~ to de ort
on nor
would
e
ave to leave and re-enter the country in
order to become an immigrant . • . • Beginning with the
1952 Act, Con ress created a mechanism, 'adjustment
o ~ tus,'
through wh1cfi a~ n already in the
United States coul.P apE].y for permanent residence
status. "

Expanding upon the Elkins Court's treatment of G-IV
aliens, one might say that there is a considerable
~------------------------.....__....__..-

that

illegal

aliens

Im~e

say

that

the

will

be

permitted

to

likelihood ~ :::;:o
u,....e_

stay

although not entitled to stay.

/l

current

~'

reality

is

that

the

INS

by
One

could ~

permits most

---------------

illegal aliens to stay by failing to take action against them
and
stay

that
even

the

INS has

though

the power

they

are

to permit

deportable.

illegal aliens
Some

~
~

~

J

to ~~}!AI->

substantial ~

portion of these people live in Texas and will be permitted to
continue to do so.

'

the

The State has no way to predict

whic ~

of

them will be deported ultimately and which of them will not. 6

6 I will be making essentially the identical argument
the preemption setting in the next section: Because the
cannot know whether an illegal alien will be deported it must
make a prediction of future immigration status--and then act on
that prediction--before the federal government has acted. This
the states may not do without treading upon federal power to
determine immigration status.

~

17.

If the state could know for sure who would be deported perhaps
it might treat these particular persons as nondomiciliaries.
Perhaps,

too,

on an individual level,

it may exclude those

aliens who are in the state on a purely transitory basis, who
have homes elsewhere, and who intend to return to these homes.
The argument that illegal aliens must be treated as
domiciliaries has the virtue of recognizing the fact that many
of these illegal aliens will live their lives out in Texas-assuming that this is true.

----

of Elkins,

and

nu-_. ~ ~b-L..

But it is a significant expansion
/\

it might lead to the apparent anomaly that

legal, nonimmigrant aliens who are not G-4 aliens and are not
permitted

to

develop

a

domicile

in

this

country

will

be

treated worse than illegal aliens--at least until such time as
they too become illegal aliens.
reflect

the

reality of

But this seeming paradox may

the situation:

illegal aliens live

here and will continue to do so whereas aliens with temporary
visas do not--not until they overstay.

Also, temporary aliens

have made a declaration that they do not intent to stay, and
perhaps it is reasonable to hold them to their word.
There may be a better way to handle the domiciliary
problem than occurs to me now.

There was a factfinding that ./).c.
But that's not a

very high figure.

The fundamental point is that unless the

Court can explain why the State must treat these people as
domiciliaries
bootless:

I

fear

equal

protection

analysis

will

be

the State can always exclude nonresidents from its

~
/~~

d-e>

/.2-~

18.

bounty.
The

Maybe you will see a way to cut through all of this.

argument

residents

that

from

the

Texas

nonresidents

is

made

simply
in

the

distinguishes
brief of

amici

---=-----

curiae school districts.

b.

scheme

Philip Kurland is on the brief.

it is rational to limit the state's educational efforts to

persons

who

are

likely

to

be employed

in

the

state and

to

become members of the state's polity.

Even
domiciled

in

may

and

work

rational.
his

if
the

the

state

state,

vote

must

and

in Boe

illegal

aliens

as

to distinguish between children who
those

Judge Reavley makes

concurrence

treat

v.

reasoning of Doe v. Plyler.

who

never

may

strikes

me

as

this argument effectively in

Wright

in which

he

attacked

the

He argued persuasively:

"I conceive that the Texas Legislature, on agreeing
that education is "the very foundation of good
citizenship," could reasonably have concluded that
it should not dilute its limited resources by
providing free public education to illegal alien
children,
who can never--absent
some
form of
amnesty--become citizens, exercise the franchise, or
serve in the armed forces of the United States."

Judge
state

law

migration.

is

Reavley
rational

argues

less

because

persuasively,
it

discourages

that

the

illegal

Even were it true that the law had this effect, I

doubt that the state is entitled to assert such an interest.
In De Canas v. Bica, 424

u.s.

351

(1976), the Court upheld a

California law making
The

Court

began

immigration

is

by

it a

to hire an illegal alien.

crime

noting

that

the

"[p]ower

unquestionably exclusively a

to

regulate

federal

power."

The Court explained that even if the California statute had
"some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration"
it

did

not

regulation

thereby
of

"become

immigration

a

that

constitutionally
Congress

proscribed

itself

would

be

powerless to authorize or approve."

The Court upheld the law

as

relationship,

a

regulation

of

the

employment

effort to stem the tide of illegal migration.

not

as

an

It appears from

De Canas that the states may not assert a purpose of affecting
migration
federal

into

the

country.

government.

Even

That

so,

and

is

the

business

even without

this

of

the

alleged

purpose, the Texas restriction on illegal aliens is rational
as

an

effort

to

persons who are

limit

not

the

barred

state's
by law

educational

effort

to

from becoming voting and

working members of the community.

c.

if the Texas scheme isn't rational what would be?

The question is rhetorical.

If it is irrational for

the states to discriminate against illegal aliens with respect
to education, one wonders whether the state could ever deny a
state benefit to an illegal alien. Presumably it would not be
equally
benefits.

irrational
The

for

the

federal

government

to

withhold

federal government can assert an interest in

20.

discouraging illegal migration.
law

irrational

the

benefit programs.

___________.,..

could

even

states

But if the Court finds this

will

be

unable

-

to

limit

their

Indeed, it is not clear to me that Congress

authorize

the

states

illegal aliens if they so chose.

to

deny

their

bounty

to

May Congress authorize the

states to violate the fourteenth amendment?

Perhaps Congress

could require the states not to provide benefits to illegal
aliens or could make it a crime for
for benefits.

illegal aliens to apply

That would be a federal decision supported by

federal purposes.

But

it

is not clear

to me

that Congress

could merely grant states the leeway to decide on their own
whether

to share benefits with

illegal aliens.

In short, a

decision that this scheme is irrational--although it may look
less radical than a decision that illegal aliens are a suspect
class--is

in

fact

a

far

reaching

holding

with

unclear

consequences.

C.

~

Are Illegal Aliens a "Suspect Class"?

The

CAS

~a'
suspect class.
~ ~~~usion that
~~d
~~

~

There

not
was

hold

that

no

need

illegal
to

do

aliens
so

the regulation was not rational.

were

given

1.

a

its

But theCA

suggest that illegal alien children might be entitled to

strict scrutiny in this context for any of three reasons .

.~
~

did

The Total Denial of Education

21.

Jl

~

-- _

The CA argued that an absolute .....denial of education
might

invoke

Antonio

strict

School

indicated

scrutiny.

District

that

the

v.

Although

411

Rodriguez,

relative

the

Court

u.s.

deprivation

in

1

of

San

(1973),

educational

benefits did not violate equal protection the Court noted that
if "elementary and secondary education were made available by
the State only to those able to pay a tuition assessed against
each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of 'poor'
people--definable
prescribed

in

terms

sum--who

would

receiving an education.

of

their

be

absolutely

the case before us today."

question,

CA

but I

would

you

finding

411

not

u.s.

take

fundamental
welfare,
education

in Rodriguez

fundamental

411

there

right

right to

etc.

from

a

at 25 n.60.
final

,._

a

the

judicial assistance than

illegal aliens to an education.

explained

pay

precluded

position

U.S.

at

to be distinguished

this

~~

is no apparent

reason

~

for

finding Oa.-~~1-'. . .
.
. -is 4 !i'w
important benef1 t--hous1ng, ~k .

37
from

("How,
the

not

for

instance,

is

significant personal
Note

that

this

De

Canas

question--upheld

a

the

Court--although

California

criminal

employers from employing illegal aliens.

not

addressing

statute

prohibiting

Is the right to work

less fundamental than the right to an education? Moreover, the
~

~

•

.,- ~41.

interests in the basics of decent food and shelter.").
in

J~

To begin with, as ~

to education and

other

on

fundamental ~

think it would be odd to find a

I /

right of

to

That case would present a far more

compelling set of circumstances for

The

inability

argument that education is somehow to be distinguished because
peculiarly

related

to

the

exercise

of

political

rights--an

argument you rejected in the context of citizens--has little
application to persons who are not entitled to engage in the
political process.

2. Illegal Aliens are "Discrete & Insular"

Given

the

holding

in

Graham

that

lawful

resident

aliens are a suspect class because "discrete and insular," it
would seem to follow that illegal aliens--indeed all aliens-are similarly suspect.
exception but there

The Court could create a "clean hands"

is nothing

in the concept of a "suspect

classification" to support the exception.
acceptable result.
protect

these

Perhaps this is an

One could say that if the Court does not

people

no one

will and

mercy of the states and the community.

that

they are at

the

On the other hand, the

notion that special judicial solicitude should be extended to
persons
they

who

have

find

broken

themselves without power
the

law,

stretches

suspect classification device
case

where

Alternatively,

the

dictates

the

precisely because
legitimacy of

to its limits.
of

logic

should

the

This may be a
be

avoided.

the Court could reconceive the resident alien

cases as based on a federal invitation to enter the country on
an equality of privileges.

~

If

3. The Children Are A Suspect Class
~

As we have discussed, the advantage of finding

the ~

children to be a suspect class is that the decision will have
some limits.

Ultimately the "suspectness" of the parents

have to be faced, but not here.

Yet it is not easy to

the

parents

by

punishing

the

children.

may ~''
~

simply ~

extend the illegitimacy cases to illegal alien children.
the illegitimacy cases the states' sole purpose was to

In ~~

punis~~

Illegitimacy

was ~~

simply irrelevant to any state purpose relating to the child.
Here the fact
relevant

to

the

state's

purpose,

not under a legal disability from

viz.

limiting

educational

remaining in the community

Nor is it clear how limited such a holding would

Presumably other state benefits that go to the care and

~~.~ upport of children--e.g. aid to dependent children--would be
%vt}l(
\ fected

by the holding.

On the other hand,

the scores of

{'- u J ¥ .ingle illegal aliens would not be affected by the decision,
1
so it does have some limiting advantages.
It

would

1-r.J

~
~~

Thus, the analogy to the illegitimacy cases is not

~~ be.

t

~

as working adults.

~ ~ lling.

~

that the child is himself an illegal alien is 4.--- ~ ~

funds to those children who will become citizens and who are

,t'~

~ ~

not

be

difficult

classification of illegal aliens.

to

create

a

suspect

we could build on the sorts

of cases we cite to in Eddings and in your dissent to Ridgeway
indicating the special place of children in the law.

But this

~,Uo

24.

result does not follow logically from the illegitimacy cases,
although there is a sense in which illegal children are being
punished for the sins of their parents.

D.

I

Conclusion

Although

commonsense

/

rebels,

qf~'

conclusion

that

illegal aliens are a "suspect class" seems ineluctable.

Yet

~

it is a result laced with contradictions.
order

to

argue

that

illegal

aliens

the

On the one hand, in
must

be

treated

as

domiciliar ies of the state, we argue that illegal aliens in
fact are permitted to live permanently in the state and are
entitled as a matter of reality to form an intent to reside
there permanently.

On the other hand, in order to argue that

illegal aliens are "discrete and insular" we point to the fact
that their illegal status disables them from exerting power in
the community. Further, on the one hand, we argue that the
equal

protection

clause

forbids

the

states

from

making

distinctions based on illegal alienage, but on the other hand
we

would

presumably

discriminate

against

governmental

interest.

permit
them

the

without

Of course

federal

government

showing

a

to

compelling

in the case of

resident

aliens the Court will treat them as a suspect class only if it
is the states that are doing the discriminating.

The federal

government with its plenary power over immigration must only
be "not irrational" in its treatment of aliens.

The Court can

build

on

this

different

treatment

of

the

states

and

the

federal government even though this difference in treatment is
best

suited

to

a

preemption

rather

than

equal

protection

analysis.

III.

A.

Preemption

De Canas v. Bica

The Court in De Canas upheld a California statute
providing that "[n)o

employ an alien

who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States
if

such

employment

resident workers."

would

have

424 U.S.

an

adverse

352 (1976).

effect on

lawful

The Court undertook

~

a

three

part

inquiry.

First,

it

held

that

the

federal power to regulate immigration under the
does

not

"[T] he
does

prohibit

fact

not

state

that aliens are

render

essentially

all

a

it

a

determintion

entrant

relevant

may

that

of

who

of

pointless

remain."

if

with

aliens:

a state statute

or

which

should

not

is
be

and the conditions under which a
Takahashi

congressional enactments of

been

Constitution ~

immigration,

should

there was preemption in those cases;
have

deal

the subject of

regulation

admitted into the country,
legal

laws

exclusive

all

state

and

aliens

Graham

examined

to determine

if

such an inquiry would

regulation

of

aliens

is

constitutionally impermissible as a regulation of immigration.

26.

Second,
was

not

the De Canas Court found

preempted

under

the

-----:.-...........;::::.
.......
-...~~~

Supremacy
-·-......- ·---------

that the statute

Clause

because

of

'--.........,;....:!

federal occupation of the field. __There is no indication that
in passing the INA Congress intended to oust state authority
to regulate the employment relationship--an important area of
state regulation.

Such a conclusion could only be justified

by a "clear and manifest" congressional purpose to occupy the
field.

Nothing

in

the

legislative

history

of

the

INA

indicates that "Congress intended to preclude even harmonious
state

regulation

employment of

touching

on

illegal aliens

aliens

in

general,

in particular."

424

or

the

u.s.

358.

The comprehensiveness of the federal scheme provides no basis
for deriving such an intent.

Moreover, there are indications

in federal law that Congress approves of state regulations of
the employment of illegal aliens.

The Farm Labor Contractor

Registration Act explicitly envisions state penalties for the
employment of illegal aliens.
Finally,
might

be

scheme.

the

preempted

Court

because

considered
it

whether

conflicted

with

the

statute

the

federal

The record was insufficient to make such a judgment.

It was possible that the state statute might operate to keep
people from working--because not entitled to lawful residence-who may have a federal permission to work here.

s&-~

The Solicitor General argues that De Canas controls ~~~
here, and it is certainly not difficult to make the
De

Canas

would

say

that

the

regulation

of

argument. ~

aliens

in

the

Z I.

pursuit

of

a proper

immigration.

state purpose

There

is

no

regulation works to deter
Canas

the

statute

is

evidence

is

an

that

regulation of
the

education

like the regulation in

immigration~

here

not a

effort

to deal with

the

caused by illegal immigration by using the federal
~· ~~~

classification scheme.

~ ~
Again, the Texas statute is not preempted by federal
~
occupation any more than the California law was. There is no

q~": ~ ind~cation

of an

~ to ~us!_~e

traditional state regulation--education.
~)

' \_,/

from an area of

Indeed, if anything,

____,...

the argument is weaker here since in De Canas there was some
indication that federal law would not punish an employer for
hiring an illegal alien and might not permit the states to
attach criminal sanctions either.
between the 5 &~
federal immigration scheme and the Texas scheme: Texas does
Finally,

there

is

no direct conflict

not exclude anyone who the federal government deems to be a
lawful resident.

argument.

B.

Preemption Defended

De

Canas
Yet

is

there

a

powerful

answer

to

a

preemption

are

indications in the Solicitor
-------~------------General's brief that the absence of a conflict between the
Texas scheme and the immigration laws is far from clear.

The

~

SG states that the immigration laws do not preempt a state

statute such as §

21.031 "at least to the extent that local

districts

school

in

Texas

look

federal

to

law

and

administrative decisions in determining whether an alien child

- -

is a 'legally admitted alien' for purposes of his entitlement
.:_.....-

'

to be admitted to public school without payment of tuition."
But federal law will seldom be clear that a particular child
is deportable until there has been a deportation order by the
INS and until all appeals have been exhausted. The SG admits
"unless

that

--

voluntarily,

-

an
he

alien

may

be

subject

physically

to

deportation

removed

from

the

departs
country

only after he has been found to be subject to deportation in
~------~~--------------------------------an administrative hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1252, subject to judicial
review in the court of appeals,
stayed. 8

u.s.c.

during which deportation is

1105(a) (3) ."

How will the state know that a child is deportable, 5~
~'f
indeed that a child is not a citizen, until there has been an ~
INS

finding?

To

administer

the

law Texas must,

in effect,

make predictions as to what the INS will do in any particular
case.

But

the

immigration

laws are notoriously complex and

replete with exceptions and the possible exercise of executive
discretion.

In short, there is no way for the state to know

whether an alien child is lawfully in the country until there

29.

determine federal

immigration status would be preempted, but

he attempts to argue that the state will not have to engage in
such determinations
the

state may

not

in this
exclude

instance.
aliens

Thus,

who were

he argues that
admitted

to

the

country legally but who have now violated the terms of their
admission:

"In

such

circumstanceds,

from

perspective, the alien properly should be viewed as
to be lawfully present under
the

federal

argues

that

government
such

a

find

federal

state 1 s S

the

continuing ~

law until officials of

him to be deportable."

determination

is

G

But he

somehow different

than

deciding whether an alien was "legally admitted":
[D]eterminations by the states that an alien
is
subject to deportation would, in our view, involve a
far
more
substantial
intereference
with
the ~~
administration of the federal immigration laws than
would a state determination whether the alien had
been lawfully admitted.
In the former situation,
the responsible state officials themselves would be
required to adjudicate an alien 1 s status under the
immigration
laws:
in
the
latter,
the
state
officials only would need to determne whether
appropriate federal officials had determined that
the alien could be lawfully admitted."

This

distinction

evaporates,

however,

when

one

considers that any individual alien may not be deported until
there has been a hearing.
"appropriate

federal

"lawfully admitted"

There has been no determination

officials"

until

that

an

alien

deportation proceedings

by

was

not

have

been

held and until it is clear that the federal government will

30.

not permit the alien to stay or adjust his status.
explains

in

footnote

9

the

Attorney

"-----

parole

aliens,

to

waive

--

General

___.

the

........___

has

requirements

------------

deportation,

to permit adjustment of status.

and

deportation,

of

to

-

power

~-

documentation,

-

suspend

As the SG

to

~c;~

to ~

"?"'

proper~

withhold
Given the

nature of the Texas scheme and the complexity of the federal
immigration laws, I think one can argue persuasively that

the ~

Texas scheme is preempted.

Only a scheme that excluded aliens

under

could survive unless the Congress

-----------------------a deportation order

explicitly permits the states to undertake to make predictions
about an alien's status under federal law.
Placing

preemption

on

the

basis

of

federal

~

~

;~~

occupation and of potential conflict with the federal scheme
does not conflict with De Canas.

~~ De

ftl.~ ~

The argumen.:__

wa~n~ made

in

Canas that state administration of its scheme would involve

the state in making immigration determinations.
possibility

of

conflict

in

that

case

was

Indeed, the

avoided

by

the

peculiar nature of the federal immigration law with respect to
employment.

Federal

law

without a certificate.

prohibits

any

Thus, the state

alien

from

working

-------could simply rely

on

the certification requirement without having to further assess
an

alien's

Moreover,

particular

the Court

status

under

the

immigration

laws.

in De Canas sent the matter back to the

state courts to determine whether any direct conflict existed
between the state and federal schemes.

Thus, the opinion did

not preclude the finding of a conflict and of preemption.

31.

In

short,

one

can

argue

that

the

possibility of

---

direct conflicts--e.g. that Texas will exclude someone who is
in fact eligible for citizenship--and the involvement of Texas
in determining an alien's status under the immigration laws-an

area

of

immigration

law

clearly

occupied by a federal
r~~JZ£W=
scheme--requires the Court to find the scheme reempted until
t-_._.

such time as Congress authorizes the states to employ a scheme

--~ /d,J-£8J,~ ~~ ~ .'

such as the on~ere. /~~~~~~c:¥~
,~~~~k~~

~ ~aL~

IV.

.134- ---~~

•

~~~;;:;::~

CONCLUSION

I think that the preemption argument can be refined
and strengthened.

Ultimately the Court may wish to consider

how

of

wide

a

regulating
penalties
already

range

latitude

aliens.
on

clear

In

employers
under

accept employment.

the

states

De

Canas

the

who

hired

illegal

federal

law that

ought

state

to

merely

aliens.

have

in

placed
It

was

such aliens could not

And had the state attempted to promote the

employment of illegal aliens the Court surely would have found
such a law preempted.

But in this case and in cases like it

the

up that

possibility opens

the

states will adopt widely

varying restrictions on illegal aliens.

- ·-

...._

welcomed

in some

""""--

.........._

-.....__

states,

Illegal aliens may be

.....,___---..,..._...

excluded from benefits

assuming equal protection is not a problem.
treatment may

violate

the

in others--

Such a varying

constitutional grant of power

Congress to establish a "uniform" system of naturalization.

to

32.

In this case, however, I do not think that the Court
needs to reach the question of uniformity.
direct

conflict

and

the

The possibility of

involvement

of

Texas

in

the

administration of the immigration laws would seem to support a
holding

on preemption on the basis of direct conflict with

federal law and of federal occupation of the field.

De Canas

can be distinguished and ought to be limited in any event.
If

the Court wishes

to reach equal protection the

best approach might be to find the children to be a suspect
class.

But

this

is

illegitimacy cases.
may

be

deemed

conclusion
follow

All

to

follows

not

be

a

that

follows

from

the

illegal aliens, perhaps all aliens,
a

suspect

easily

from Graham that

holding

from

classification.

Graham.

So,

the aliens would

too,

Such
it

a

would

not be treated as

suspect vis a vis the federal government but only in relation
to

state

regulation.

That

is a

distinction which has

been

criticized, but it does exist.
On the whole I
illegal aliens are
perhaps that
finding

the

a

prefer preemption.

"suspect class"

sticks

A holding that
in my craw but

is a matter of prejudice on my part.
aliens

to

be

"suspect,"

I

do not

see

Short of
how

the

scheme can be invalidated under a lower level of review.
I would be delighted to do more work on this if you
are assigned the opinion or if you would like more analysis on
any particular point before making up your mind.
rather in a rush.

I wrote this
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Dear Chief:

'.;.

; ..

I'll try my hand at the Court opinion in these cases .

-

.

t·

~

.

~

-·.

Sincerely,
/}

·.'. \: . ,~·-··. .... ~
;.

/~

Chief Justice Burger
C~pies

to the Conference

No. 80-1934

-

.:§nprmu <!]curl of f!rt ~b jllth$'
~zurJri:ngLrn. ~.

<!f.

20~JI..;l

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

J. BRENNAN, JR.

January 25, 1982

Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934 -- Plyler v. Doe, Etc.

Dear Lewis,

.

.i
'

I am taking what is for me the unusual step of circulating only to you, Thurgood, Harry and John, an
unproofread draft of a proposed opinion for the Court in
the Alien Children cases.
My conference notes show no
clear consensus with respect to the level of scrutiny to
be afforded the Texas statute.
But my impression was .
that those who voted with me to affirm shared my particular concern with a statute, such as this, that sought to
deprive innocent children not remotely responsible for
their plight of their right to an education.
The draft thus relies both on the nature of the
classification, and on the importance of education within
the framework of the Equal Protection Clause. The holding is this: A State may not except a discrete and historically demeaned group of children from the education
it provides to all other children within the State. In
relying on both factors, I believe the opinion is less
broad than it might be if it concerned itself only with
the "fundamentality" of education, or the "class" of innocent children. However, since a strong case for
heightened scrutiny could be made simply on the basis of
the class discriminated against, I thought it appropriate, indeed necessary, where denial of basic education
was at stake, to hold strict scrutiny standards applicable. As a by-product of applying strict scrutiny, the
opinion proposes to credit the state with fairly broad
prerogatives in legislating with respect to illegal
aliens in other contexts. Finally, it seems to me that
the historical approach of this draft, although leading
to strict scrutiny here, is for that very reason largely
self-limiting and unlikely to force us down any uncharted
paths in the future.
In my view, the Texas statute would fail under even
an intermediate standard of review, with the draft cut
short on page 23, and picked up again on 34, with the
same ultimate result. But I do suggest that exclusive
reliance on the "innocent children" rationale, would

truncate our real concern here--that whatever else the
state may do with respect to illegal aliens, barring the
innocent children among them from basic education is most
perverse. I'd much appreciate your reaction to this
analysis.

I

Sincerely,
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BREN SALLY-POW

lfp/ss 01/26/82

80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler
Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to

,·

review a draft of your proposed opinion.

I have read it

only once, and write promptly to record a major concern.
The class alleged to be discriminated against and the only class before us children of illegal aliens.

is composed of school age

There is a good deal of

language in the draft (particularly pp. 19-21) that will be
read as indicating that all illegal aliens, adults as well
as children, may be "dist I'
'ete and insular minorities for
which the Constitution offers a special solicitude".
The draft states, for example, that many of the
reasons that have prompted us to be solicitous of "lawful
resident aliens" apply
aliens".

"with even greater force to illegal

I could not agree to this.

You do recognize (p.

22) that adult aliens (in my view any alien beyond school
age) who enters the United States unlawfully is guilty of a
crime.

Such an alien also is at deportable, subject only

to due process. ~

As I indicated at Conference, and

as you emphasize in other portions of the opinion, school
age children of illegal aliens are in this country - at
least presumptively - through no fault
own.

o~

volition of their

They are, as you correctly say, innocent victims who

2.

"can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own
status".

I would limit our decision narrowly to this

readily identifiable class.
.· . .

.~-··r·. ·..·

I
·r:t

Although I am not entirely at rest ,J would prefer

II

'

not to characterize

this as "suspect" entitled to the

highest level of scrutiny that we accord "discrete and
insular minorities".

This concept has never been applied to

persons unlawfully in the United States.

I would think it

sufficient to apply - as you suggest as an alternative - the
intermediate level of scrutiny that we sometimes call
"heightened".

The class also can be described as unique.

I agree generally with your dual reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause and the importance of education at
the public school level.

Indeed, the state has a

substantial interest itself in assuring that this level of
education be afforded all children, including those of
illegal aliens in view of the finding of the DC that a high
percentage of these children remain in our country.
I will take a closer look at the language of this
part of the opinion.

My concern when I wrote Rodriguez was

not to create a chain reaction:

if education is a

fundamental right in a constitutional sense, then certain
health and welfare - and possibly other services (e.g.
utilities) - would be candidates for this status.
I venture several general observations, Bill,
about the draft opinion.

It is well written and even

3.

I suppose all of us, however, prefer shorter and

eloquent.

more narrowly focused opinions.

Your drafts sweeps rather

broadly, and leaves me a little uneasy as to inferences that
may be drawn from it in other connections not clearly
forseeable.

As I indicated at Conference, I view this case

in rather simplistic terms.

The alien children are victims

of a combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2, 000 mile border , is readily
available and could not be controlled if the entire armed
forces of the United States were assigned the task.

Aliens

are attracted by our vastly superior employment
opportunities.

Congress, as you state, has been unwilling

to make unlawful the employment of illegal aliens.
circumstances, they will continue to enter the
high percentage of them will remain here.

u.s.,

In these
and a

I agree with you

that in these circumstances their children should not be
left on the streets uneducated.

This is all that this case

is about.
I will certainly join your judgment, and hope that
in the drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be
focused so specifically on this uniquely discrete class that
I can join it also.
Sincerely,

dfl 01/26/82
To: Justice Powell
From:
Re:

David
Justice Brennan's draft in 80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

I
Brennan's draft.

give

you

some

immediate

reaction

to Justice

I would like to spend a day or so going back over

the briefs and relevant cases.

First,

I

think that because of the way that the

opinion is drafted it is a highly significant equal protection case.
The

Court

has

had

two

lines

of

equal protection cases

"strict scrutiny"--the "fundamental rights" cases
and

the

aliens).

"suspect classification"
But

here

Justice

line

of

Brennan

classification" or a "fundamental right."
suspect

class--illegal

right"--education.
strict scrutiny.

alien

cases

finds

(voting,
(blacks,

neither

a

that

use

travel)
resident
"suspect

Rather, he finds a quasi-

children--and

a

quasi

"fundamental

The sum of these parts yields the foundation for
This is fairly close to the sort of sliding scale

Justice Marshall advocated in Rodriguez.

The problem with such an

approach is that it permits judges to impose their personal values
on state and federal legislators and officials.
any limiting principle;

It is hard to see

there are so many groups of people who have

-------------~

moral claims upon us or who appear to be worthy of special aid and
succor.

There

is nothing

in the Constitution that gives pride of

place to children as opposed to the handicapped, the mentally ill,
th~

ag~d

There is nothing that places education
a living wage, or spiritual fulfillment.

the widowed.

or

before food, housing,

The rather dramatic
group

is

a

"discrete

"fundamental"

is

and

perhaps

insular

some

result of concluding that a

minority"

limit on

their

or

that

use.

a

right

But

is

if quasi-

discreteness and "pretty important" rights suffice then judges may
leg is late with

the

impression that they merely decide the case in

front of them, with its particular combination of groups and rights.
I

think

that

this

is disturbing.

The opinion here strikes me as

'

result-oriented in the bad sense of the word and that is disturbing
in

itself.

putting

But more

together

a

troubling
like

is

potage

the prospect of other decisions

of

half

suspect

fundamental rights to reach the desired result.

groups

and

half

Your letter at page

2 suggests that you agree generally with the opinion's dual reliance
on equal protection and the importance of public education.

So you

may not share the same worry.
I
decision.

would

not

impugn

They are honorable.

the

values

I share them.

underlying

the

I know that you do.

But I do not know that they are constitutionally required.

Second,
indicate

that

education

to

disingenuous

the
be
and

I

framers
a

of

the

that

rather

education is

important.

not

education

the

fourteenth

constitutionally

-----

unnecessary.

~

whether

think

protected

be

denied

a

group

of

amendment
value

The question

We know that it is.
can

use

history

to

considered
is

somewhat

is not whether

And the question is
of

people

who

are

entitled

to

it.

But

I

do

not

believe

that

the

framers

of

the

fourteenth amendment gave any thought to whether citizens of Mexico
who

defy

our

education.

immigration

And

if

laws

would

be

entitled

they had given the matter

doubt what their conclusion would have been.

to

a

free

thought, one cannot
I am sure that many

"rights" were considered important by the framers.

They undoubtedly

thought that it was essential that blacks be permitted to vote and
to work.

Yet we do not permit illegal aliens to do either of things

and I do not suppose that Justice Brennan is suggesting otherwise.

Third, I think that the opinion may overstate the
extent to which illegal aliens are permanent members of the state's
communities.

The district judge in 80-1934 found only that 10% of

illegal aliens were here permanently.

Finally,
way

of

looking

illegitimacy
discussed.

at

the

cases.

I would not quarrel strongly with your

case--essentially

The

analogy

is

on

not

an

analogy

perfect

as

change

be

we

the
have

And if the record were more convincing that the presence

of these children was a serious burden on the schools,
would

to

troubling

the

for

the

education of

illegal alien children.

its

Court

to

lawful

require

children

the

I

state

in order

think it
to

short

to educate

I guess I am still troubled by this.

On the whole, and now having seen what an equal
protection opinion looks like,
approach than before.

I

am more partial

to a preemption

I still think that this is the most honest

.....
way

to

deal

with

the

case.

It

seems

more

restrained

arbitrary in the sense of imposing one value over another.

and

less

But it

does have its problems as well.
I would like to think more about the analogy to
the

illegitimacy cases.

If

you

have

any

interest

in pursuing

concurrence on preemption, I can think more about that too.
be interesting to read the dissent.

a

It will

January 30, 1982
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler
Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportuni.ty to
review a draft of your proposed opinion. I submit the
following reactions, some of which may be tentative.
As I indicated at Conference, I view this case in
rather simplistic terms. The children are victims of a
combination of circumstances. Access from Mexi.co into this
country, across our 2,000 mile border, is readily available
and could not he controlled if the entire armed forces of
the United States were assigned the task. Aliens are
attracted by our vastly superior employment opportunities,
not to mention other benefits. Congress, has been unwilling
to make unlawful. the employment of such aliens. In these
circumstances, they will continue to enter the u.s., and a
certain percentage of them will remain here. Their children
should not be left on the streets uneducated.
Illegal Aliens as a Suspect Class
Once a class is characterized, as "suspect" the
state must show a compellinq interest to ;ustify
discriminatory treatment. We have never held that persons
unlawfully in this country, whatever their age, are a
suspect class i.n the full meaning of the term. I view the
classification before us as a unique one. As the class is
composed of innocent children, uniquely postured, I would
agree that a "heightened" level of scrutiny is required.
Thus, the state must establish a substantial interest to
justify the discrimination. In a sense, this may be viewed
as middle-tier analysis. It i.s, however, one we have
reserved for certain situations, e.g., Craig v. Boren. As
Texas has advanced no interest that I consi~er sufficiently
substantial to justify the discrimination, I agree that
there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Having the foregoing views, I could not join Part
III-A of your draft {pp. 18-23), as pre!llently written. I

2.

certainly could not join pp. 19-21 that come very close to
saying that all illegal aliens may be "discrete and insular
minorities for whi.ch the Constitution offers a special
solicitude".
In sum, as to the class oiscriminated against, I
could not agree that it is "suspect" in the sense in which
we have previously used this term. I do agree that the
classification depriving innocent children of an education
merits heightened scrutiny, and that it doesn't meet this
test.
Feliance on Education
I served for 19 years on the Richmono Public
School Board and the Virginia State Board of Fducation. I
fully share your view as to the importance of P~ucation,
particularly in a democracy. ~"'e are talkinq, however, about
what the Constitution requires and this was my concern in
Rodriguez. !t t~as my vie~l'l then and now that therP. is no
const1tutional riqht to a state provided education any more
than there is such a constitutiona1 right to welf.are,
housing, health services, public works and public utilities
- all of which are considered by most of us to be essential.
I therefore would not characterize education as a
"fundamental" right in the constitutional sense.
As your draft notes, t did make clear in Rodri<Juez
that the sitaution would be different if a state had dented
education altogether to a particular class. This remains my
view.
Your ~raft appears to view the ~ourteenth
Amendment as creating an expectation of nuhJic enucation.
As 'I am not sur~ ~'here tl) is would lead us, I need to examine
your language in this respect more carefully. t have not
viewe~ the Amendment as the source of any right to
education.
Thus, I would rest our holding squarely on the
Equal Protection Clause - though emphasizing generally the
importance of education.
In weighing the state interests, you have
mentioned - and I would emphasize even further - the
insubstantialitY of. its asserted interE>:::-t as compared with
the state's own interest in not creating a subclass of
illiterate persons many of whom may remain in Texas, adding
to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and
crime.

. .·

3.

Relatively Minor Points
1. The paragraph at page 10, at the conclusion of
footnote 10, should be limited to the discussion at hand:
whether illegal aliens are within the Fourteenth Amendment.
Taken out of context, this paragraph says more than it ought
to.
2. Footnote 15 seems to be unnecessary in i. ts
suggestion that a state tuition program, acrosR the board,
might violate equal protection.
3. At page 19, the first sentence state~ that "~he
experience of our Nation has taught us that a conscious or
unconscious, but in any event constitutionally unacceptable,
prejudice is likely to manifest itself in the legislature's
treatment of some groups." I'm not sure how thts sentence
squares with the court's requirement of a showing of intent
to cU scr i.roinate in t4ashington v. navis.
Your draft opinion is an impressive piece of. work,
and I have enjoyed reading i.t-.- I suppose all of us prefer
shorter and more narrowly focused opinions. As indicated
above, the draft sweeps rather broadly, ano leaves me a
little uneasy as to inferences that may be drawn from it in
other connections not clearly foreseeable.
I will join your judgment, and hope that in the
drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be focused
so specifically on this uniquely discrete class that I can
join your opinion also.
Sincerely,

,Just ice Brennan
lfp/ss

) r;( (,,,,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST I CE W M. J . BR E N N AN, JR.

January 25, 1982

Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934 -- Plyler v. Doe, Etc.

Dear Lewis,
I am taking what is for me the unusual step of circulating only to you, Thurgood, Harry and John, an
unproofread draft of a proposed opinion for the Court in
the Alien Children cases.
My conference notes show no
clear consensus with respect to the level of scrutiny to
be afforded the Texas statute.
But my impression was
that those who voted with me to affirm shared my particular concern with a statute, such as this, that sought to
deprive innocent children not remotely responsible for
their plight of their right to an e ~ ation.
The draft thus relies both on th ~ ature of the
classification, and on th~ mportance of education within
the framework of the Equal Protection Clause. The holdin[_i § t ~ is: A State may not except a discrete and historically demeaned group of children from the education
it provides to all other children within the State. In
relyin2 on both factors, I believe the opinion is less
broad than i t mi ght iDe if it concerned itself only with
the "fundamentality" of education, or the "class" of innocent children. However, since a strong case for
heightened scrutiny could be made simply on the basis of
the class discriminated against, I thought it appropriate, indeed necessary, where denial of basic education
was at stake, to hold strict scrutiny standards applicable. As a by-producto f apply i ng strict scrutiny, the
opinion proposes to credit the state with fairly broad
prerogatives in legislating with respect to illegal
aliens in other contexts. Finally, it seems to me that
the historical approach of this draft, although leading
to strict scrutiny here, is for that very reason largely
self-limiting and unlikely to force us down any uncharted
paths in the future .
In my view, the Texas statute would fail under even
an intermediate standard of review, with the draft cut
short Qn-pag e 2 3, ana~i c k e a up again on 34 , with the
same ultimate result. But I do suggest that exclusive
reliance on the "innocent children" rationale, would

truncate our real concern here--that whatever else the
state may do with respect to illegal aliens, barring the
innocent children among them from basic education is most
perverse. I'd much appreciate your reaction to this
analysis.
Sincerely,

-------- 5~ ~ ~ ~ t}/s ~~I~ J
{ ~ ~ ~ d/,t"-'?1- ~
~·)
lfp/ss 01/26/82

BREN SALLY-POW
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to
review a draft of your proposed opinion.

I have read it

only once, and write promptly to record a major concern.

~

The class alleged to be discriminated against - and the
only class before us - is composed of school age children
of illegal aliens.

There is a good deal of language in

the draft (particularly pp. 19-21) that will be read as
indicating that all illegal aliens, adults as well as
children, may be

oeR~iee ~ e

t~s

"discete and insular

minorities for which the Constitution offers a special
solicitude" ·1/The draft states, for example, that many of
the reasons that have prompted us to be solicitous of
"lawful resident aliens"
to illegal aliens".

appl ~

"with even greater force

~~I could ~rl\agree to this.

/Its

lf,.ou

~

dL)

~ recogniz~ . zz)~adul ~aliens (~

in my

view any alien beyond school age) who enters the United

~.a.....va~ ....... ~
States unlawfully is guilty of a crime~ Ais at lQast
deportable,

1\

~/:~Q:Oto~ ~::~g~t

2.

in situations not presently relevant.

Even

is, however, entitled
As I indicated at Conference, and as you
emphasize in other portions of the opinion, school age
children of illegal aliens are in this country - at least
tr})-

presumptively - through no fault of volition of their own.
They are, as you correctly say, innocent victims who "can
affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own
status".

~J~~f~~.

f..,~~ H<A~ ~ ~..,.,~
Although I am not entirely at rest, I ~ ~

in~±n~-nht~~eh~ae~~
~'ze~ thi~~~A~
the highest level of
scrutiny that we accord "discrete and insular minorities".
~

This eoncept has never been applied to persons unlawfully
in the United States.

I would think it sufficient to

apply - as you suggest as an alternative - the
intermediate level of scrutiny that we sometimes call
~

"heightened".

The class

~can

~

I agree with your

1

Protection Clause and the

be described as unique.

-+L
dual ~l,iance

fune~~~al

education at the public school level.

on the Equal

importance of
Indeed, the state

3.

has a substantial interest itself in assuring that this
level of education be afforded all children, including
those of illegal aliens in view of the finding of the DC
~
that tfte high percentage of these children remain in our

1

country. ~

will take a closer look at the language of

this part of the opinion.

My concern when I wrote

Rodriguez was not to create a chain reaction:

.

if
~

t.-r.- e:v

education is a fundame?tal right~ certainly health and

-

~~ ~ ~r~!f.

welfareAwould be

u.ldc...Y-

candidates for this status.

Afld

o(2...D

i B_A

T

fundamental that every school district

a state must provide identical per pupil funding f f not
identical curricula, teacher qualifications,

,
.
etc.

type of equality were held necessary within a state, the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment could I suppose - be invoked to require equality nationwide
(e.g., the rural schools of Arkansas and the elitist
schools of

Westchester communities such as Scarsdale,
As ideally desirable as this

be, other considerations - that are fundamental in
r federal system and with our system of local control o
p blic education - must be weighed.

k

) ~

4.

One of the strongest arguments made on behalf of
petitioners (the state and county) is that durational
residency requirements have been sustained by our Court

I

o state educational institution •

E.g.,

As I kn w from my own long expe ience in public
ucation, school dis

icts customari y charge tuition to

tudents from other distr'cts who
geographically conveni

ay wish to attend a

t or deemed to be superior.

who sought the
or Fairfax schools.

would hold

op n the right of the state or a county
tional residency requirements with respect
ren of illegal aliens.

This would be

rly important at the high school level where
teena e children living near the border might enter simply
educational purposes.
~t-z.

.. ,..,

~

~

1

I I'fte:lte -a general observationJ-\ Bill, about the

~~~~

It is eloquent
~

.

a~a

iAtQresting.

I suppose all

of us, however, prefer shorter and more narrowly focused
opinions.

Your drafts sweeps rather broadly, and leaves

5.

me a little uneasy as to inferences that may be drawn from
it in other connections not clearly forseeable.

As I

indicated at Conference, I view this case in rather
simplistic terms.

The alien children are victims of a

combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2,000 mile border is readily
available and could not be controlled if the entire armed
forces of the United States were assigned the task.

~~~~~-Ar~~
Em~oyme~~uRitie~ in-Gu~

~QUAt~y

•~e~vastly

~~ ~fu-,..c...~
superior ~

..

Congress, as you state, has been unwilling to

~

make unlawful the employment of illegal aliens.
circumstances, they will continue to enter the
high percentage of them will remain here.

In these

u.s.,

and a

J1 ~ ~

~~M.~~~~~
~~~~~~~

A-~~.~~~~
1/Zc..-- ~ ~ ~

Y~~~~~
~

/~ ...-c-R..~~~~

~~~~~~
~~~~~

.

~~ ~r·44'

~'A. ~ ~

t}

~~

:..t:.."' /.._...
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BREN SALLY-POW
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to
review a draft of your proposed opinion.

I have read it

only once, and write promptly to record a major concern.
The class alleged to be discriminated against and the only class before us - is composed of school age
children of illegal aliens.

There is a good deal of

language in the draft (particularly pp. 19-21) that will be
read as indicating that all illegal aliens, adults as well
as children, may be "discete and insular minorities for
which the Constitution offers a special solicitude".
The draft states, for example, that many of the
reasons that have prompted us to be solicitous of "lawful
resident aliens" apply
aliens".

"with even greater force to illegal

I could not agree to this.

You do recognize (p.

22) that adult aliens (in my view any alien beyond school
age) who enters the United States unlawfully is guilty of a
crime.

Such an alien also is at deportable, subject only

to due process.

As I indicated at Conference, and

as you emphasize in other portions of the opinion, school
age children of illegal aliens are in this country - at
least presumptively - through no fault of volition of their
own.

They are, as you correctly say, innocent victims who

2.

"can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own
status".

I would limit our decision narrowly to this

readily identifiable class.
Although I am not entirely at rest, would prefer
not to characterize

this as "suspect" entitled to the

highest level of scrutiny that we accord "discrete and
insular minorities".

This concept has never been applied to

persons unlawfully in the United States.

I would think it

sufficient to apply - as you suggest as an alternative - the
intermediate level of scrutiny that we sometimes call
"heightened".

The class also can be described as unique.

I agree generally with your dual reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause and the importance of education at
the public school level.

Indeed, the state has a

substantial interest itself in assuring that this level of
education be afforded all children, including those of
illegal aliens in view of the finding of the DC that a high
percentage of these children remain in our country.
I will take a closer look at the language of this
part of the opinion.

My concern when I wrote Rodriguez was

not to create a chain reaction:

if education is a

fundamental right in a constitutional sense, then certain
health and welfare - and possibly other services (e.g.
utilities) - would be candidates for this status.
I venture several general observations, Bill,
about the draft opinion.

It is well written and even

,., .

3•

eloquent.

I suppose all of us, however, prefer shorter and

more narrowly focused opinions.

Your drafts sweeps rather

broadly, and leaves me a little uneasy as to inferences that
may be drawn from it in other connections not clearly
forseeable.

As I indicated at Conference, I view this case

in rather simplistic terms.

The alien children are victims

of a combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2,000 mile border is readily
available and could not be controlled if the entire armed
forces of the United States were assigned the task.

Aliens

are attracted by our vastly superior employment
opportunities.

Congress, as you state, has been unwilling

to make unlawful the employment of illegal aliens.
circumstances, they will continue to enter the
high percentage of them will remain here.

u.s.,

In these
and a

I agree with you

that in these circumstances their children should not be
left on the streets uneducated.

This is all that this case

is about.
I will certainly join your judgment, and hope that
in the drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be
focused so specifically on this uniquely discrete class that
I can join it also.
Sincerely,

dfl 01/28/82

To:

Justice Powell

From:

David
Re:

Justice

Brennan 1 s

draft

in Plyler

v.

Doe,

Nos.

80-

1538, 80-1934

Justice Brennan has constructed an argument for
that

stands

on

three

legs:

are (illeg~l

"strict

scrutiny"

these

aliens;

these are children; and the right at issue--education--was

particularly important to the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
In theory, each one of these legs is essential to the holding.

Illegal Aliens as a Suspect Class

Part IliA,

pages 18-23 discusses whether or not

illegal aliens are a "suspect class."

Much of this discussion is

disturbing particularly at pages 19-20.

If this discussion is to be

retained I think that footnote 18 ought to be moved into text.
there

is

problem,

something
but

the

wrong
problem

in

the

tone.

is

overwhelming

Lax enforcement may be a
and

made

worse

"suspect class 111 determination to enter the country.
fact

that persons who are here

"complaints"

to

the

attention

illegally hesitate
of

public

Also

by

Further,

the

the · ~

to bring their

authorities,

should

not

necessarily entitle them to special judicial protection. Presumably,
there are some benefits to being a lawful resident or citizen.

r~

2.

I

think

simply drop pages 18-20.
alien"

you

might

request

Justice

Brennan

to

That is, he might simply drop the "illegal
I

leg of his argument.

suppose

it might be a bit odd to

write an opinion such as this without relying on the fact that these
childrens are aliens, particularly in light of the Court's holding
in Graham that resident aliens are a "suspect class."

But somehow I

think it sits better to say that these children are entitled to an
education despite the fact that they are here illegally rather than
because they are here in violation of the law.
If

Justice

Brennan

were

agreeable

to

this

suggestion, he could pick up the discussion with the first paragraph
on page 21, discussing the illegal alien children.
of

illegal alien children

with

further

comparison

to

is too short and should be fleshed out
the

illegitimacy cases and

other cases as well indicating the
life and in law.
heightened

The discussion

perhaps

to

"special place" of children in

One could conclude this section by holding that a

standard

of

review

is

appropriate--something

like

the

standard used in the illigitimacy cases.

Education

Part
place

education

occupied

fourteenth amendment.

I
opinion.

IIIB,
in

pages
the

23-34
minds

discusses
of

the

the

framers

special
of

the

Part IIIC contrasts this case to Rodriguez.

am of a divided mind as to this part of the

The opinion links the level of scrutiny to the importance

?

3.

of

the

right

without

"fundamental" right.

finding

the

right

to

be

a

so-called

If you were writing the opinion, you might as

well wish to emphasize the importance of education, and place this
along side of the "innocent children" rationale as a reason to take
a

searching look at what the state

honest.

We are disturbed

education is so serious.

is doing.

And,

that would be

in this case because the deprivation of
On the other hand, for all the reasons you

gave in Rodriguez it is hard for the Court to isolate certain areas
of life and term them fundamental.

And if the right at stake here

were participation in a child abuse program I don't think you would
feel

that

would.

the

right

was

any

less

important,

Justice Brennan makes a valiant effort

although
t~ve

maybe

education a

~-------------~

source in the fourteenth amendment.
On the whole,
~

I

you
~

I find this quite unconvincing.

tend to think that this portion

of the opinion is acceptable.

I think it is much too long, and that

the

to

history

shortened.

portion

ought

be

eliminated

or

dramatically

,...,..

I think it is fair to say that when a group of

childr~ n

are totally deprived of an education, through no fault of their own,
it is reasonable to require the state to show that its interests are
substantial
interests.

and

the

scheme

designed

to

fulfil

these

substantial

Certainly, the fourteenth amendment ought to stand as a

barrier to the creation of new suspect classifications.

Depriving

these children of an education, will likely create a discrete and
insular minority if they are not already one.
In short,
on the children

I

aspect~lters

think you can join if he refocusses
the level of scrutiny,

of the illegal aliens as a suspect class discussion.

an~rops

most

~

4.

I adj /the following minor points:
/ /1.

The paragraph at page 10, at the conclusion of

footnote lO( .hould be limited to the discussion at hand:
illegal aliens are within the fourteenth amendment.

whether

Taken out of

context, this paragraph says more than it oug

2.

Footnote 15 seems to be

in its suggestion

that a state tuition program, across the r

ard, might violate equal

protection.

3.
experience

At
of

unconscious,

page
our

but

19,

the

first

Nation

has

taught

in

any

event

to

manifest

sentence
us

that

states
a

constitutionally

that

--

"The

conscious

or

~

unacceptable,

r

prejudicee

is

likely

itself

in

the

legislature's

~_,

treatment of some groups."

I'm not sure how this sentence squares

with the Court's requirement of a showing of intent to discriminate
in washington v. Davis. ~

My only question remains whether the Court ought
to

elevate

children

necessities of life.

and

education

over

other

groups

and

other

I wont keep harrying you with this point, but

I find it somewhat troubling.

And this is why I prefer preemption.

The Court has consistently emphasized the uniquely strong nature of
federal

power

over

immigration,

and

the

Constitution

gives

this

5.

authority to the federal government in express terms.
DeCanas can be limited to the area of employment.
great

benefit

approach
attack

which
the

and

disabilities.
position.
conference

have

builds

problem

employment--but
workforce

to

they
yet
That

I

think

DeCanas

on

on DeCanas
of

illegal

may

not

penalize
seems
you

the

tells

the

migration

accept
that

to

books,

be

reported

the

Indeed, it is a
for

a

states
at

with

a

perfectly

that

Justice

they may

source--e.g.

of

an

all

illegal

sorts

sensible
Blackmun

that preemption was his prefered approach.

will have something to say on the matter.

preemption

that

its

benefits

workforce

I think that

of

policy
said

at

Perhaps he

(l
A
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PLYLER SALLY-POW
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to
review a draft of your proposed opinion.

I submit the

.,~iii...

following reactions, some of which may be tentative.
As I indicated at Conference, I view this case
in rather simplistic terms.
combination of circumstances.

The children are victims of a
Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2,000 mile border, is readily
available and could not be controlled if the entire armed
forces of the United States were assigned the task.
Aliens are attracted by our vastly superior employment
opportunities, not to mention other

benefits . ~vailable

Congres;_t as

YO' ~

~ has been unwilling to make unlawful the employment

of such aliens.

In these circumstances, they will

continue to enter the U.S., and a certain percentage of
them will remain here.

In these circumstances their

2.

streets uneducated.
Illegal Aliens as a Suspect Class
~

Once a class

is ~

I t .,...,

~~ """ _A. -

J.

-

,~....,/'~

characterize ~

U

the state must

~
show a compelling interest to

justi ~~

We have never

held that persons unlawfully in this country, whatever
their age, are a suspect class in the full meaning of the

~lassificatio~1\~ unique one.
~ is.... d..:i s.c rjmin .ated a gain st by 'f'ex~ :.- As we a rQ. dealing
term.

I view

t4-I-Lv d.c..u.... w
heT e

1M6h ~innocent

~ ~
children, uniquely

an-> edz tt( co-~

postured ~ 1 I

would

~
~

:
~~;t=~~~~·;--l:;
....-~M.s.e-ri:ifti~ ±'efl ~ cr ~'hetghlenee" l e·; e l r
afT<''~ eAJ ~~~··~~~ t4- ~
d r e x atrr±ne: e.ioA -ane~~ state must establish a
•
r

substantial interest to justify the discrimination.
sense,

~s

In a

this may be viewed as middle tier analysis.

It is, however, one we have reserved for certain
situations, e.g., Craig v. Bowen.

As Texas has advanced

no interest that I consider sufficiently substantial to
justify the discrimination, I agree)' that there has been a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Having the foregoing views, I could not join
Part III-A of your draft (pp. 18-23), as presently

3.

written.

I certainly could not join pp. 19-21 that come

very close to saying that all illegal aliens may be
"discrete and insular minorities for which the
Constitution offers a special solicitude".
In sum, as to the class discriminated against, I
could not agree that it is "suspect" in the sense in which
we have previously used this term.

I do agree that the

classification depriving innocent children of an education
merits heightened scrutiny.

Poss~y~ an

eeYla

aooe~t

Reliance on Education
As

yof~9RHes-.

I bo.ue

~

uiews~

I served for 19 years on the public school board

~

1

() Richmone and the Virginia State Board of Education.

I

fully share your view as to the importance of education,
particularly in a democracy.

/~

~, ~ are talking about
-1

what the Constitution requires and this was my concern in
Rodriguez.

9 that there is no
It was my view then---and now

constitutional right to a state provided education any
more than there is such a constitutional right to welfare,

4.

housing health services, public works and public utilities
I

- all of which are essential to a modern socie ~
As your draft notes, I did make

•

..jA(,

clea~

¢--

:> t.er

~~~~-4
Rodr iguez l\e11ld 'Aaue..

9ee ~

different if a state had denied

education altogether to a particular class.

This remains

I - "'B'gtec'"lf'itb your · @mphasi:! of Ll~ impor t:a.ee of edtWatioR 1 ~

1~~

~

b"t """'"\ not characterize; ; as a "fundamental"

righ~

appears to view the

constitutional sense

Fourteenth Amendment as creating an expectation of public

t1.A., 5> a.--~ ~,A~~~ ~~--.~-f ~
education.

~ I

l~~ e.A.

1 do n~ vie~,sthe Amendment as

respect more carefully.
the source of

..1

need to examine your language in this

~

right to education other than not to be

discriminated against.

Thus, I would rest our holding

squarely on the Equal Protection Clause. -

~j,J ~
~~~

In weighing the state interests, you have
mentioned - and I would emphasize even further - the
insubstantiality of

·d;i

~

~

~•

~!$!!&
~ ~~

asserted interest as compared with
~

the state's own interest in not creating

...

a ~ lass

of

illiterate persons many of whom may remain in Texas,

5.

teenager O!'J aRd

A«•{
ad1::1l~s ~nemployment,

welfare A

crime , ~

Relatively Minor Points
(Copy p. 4 David's memo)
Your draft opinion is an impressive piece of
work, and I have enjoyed reading it.

I suppose all of us

prefer shorter and more narrowly focused opinions.

As

~ - _ "z:bi1.C f a •• ~
indicated above, the draft sweeps ra~ ~ broadly, and
leaves me a little uneasy as to inferences that may be
drawn from it in other connections not clearly

join your judgment, and hope that in the
drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be focused
so specifically on this uniquely discrete class that I can
join your opinion also.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan

'

•

lfp/ss 01/29/82

PLYLER SALLY-POW
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

Dear Bill:
Thank you for affording me the opportunity to
review a draft of your proposed opinion.

I submit the

following reactions, some of which may be tentative.
As I indicated at Conference, I view this case
in rather simplistic terms.
combination of circumstances.

The children are victims of a
Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2,000 mile border, is readily
available and could not be controlled if the entire armed
forces of the United States were assigned the task.
Aliens are attracted by our vastly superior employment
opportunities, not to mention other benefits. Congress,
has been unwilling to make unlawful the employment of such
aliens.
enter the

In these circumstances, they will continue to

u.s.,

remain here.

and a certain percentage of them will

Z!nthese circumstanc~ .....~heir

not be left on the streets uneducated.
Illegal Aliens as a Suspect Class

children should

2.

Once a class is characterized, as "suspect" the
state must show a compelling interest to justify
discriminatory treatment.

We have never held that persons

unlawfully in this country, whatever their age, are a
suspect class in the full meaning of the term.
classification before us as a unique one.

I view the

As the class is

composed of innocent children, uniquely postured, I would
agree

h..,

t ~at

a "heightened" level of scrutiny is required.

Thus, the state must establish a substantial interest to
justify the discrimination.

In a sense, this may be

viewed as middle tier analysis.

It is, however, one we

have reserved for certain situations, e.g., Craig v.
Bowen.

As Texas has advanced no interest that I consider

sufficiently substantial to justify the discrimination, I
agree that there has been a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Having the foregoing views, I could not join
Part III-A of your draft (pp. 18-23) , as presently
written.

I certainly could not join pp. 19-21 that come

very close to saying that all illegal aliens may be

3.

"discrete and insular minorities for which the
Constitution offers a special solicitude".
In sum, as to the class discriminated against, I
could not agree that it is "suspect" in the sense in which
we have previously used this term.

I do agree that the

classification depriving innocent children of an education
merits heightened scrutiny/

1'/

a..4.l.

~t-1-~~

~.;- ~ ~f-.

Reliance on Education
I served for 19 years on the Richmond Public
School Board and the Virginia State Board of Education.

I

fully share your view as to the importance of education,
particularly in a democracy.

We are talking, however,

about what the Constitution requires and this was my
'

~

concern in Rodriguez.

It was my view then

and~ now

that

there is no constitutional right to a state provided
education any more than there is such a constitutional

~

right to welfare, housing health services, public works

/

~~~~

and public utili ties - all of which aref essential ,tooQ...a

J

o

MOEieEii

~ SJh-o&mprii&t's ~he

~0~
-iJi:I?ortF'!!S• ei?~~ I b'A ~e-r e would not

£fii

-Gtvf ./'

t7J ~

1-e> _t..,_

4.

characterize education as a "fundamental" right in the
constitutional sense.
As your draft notes, I did make clear in
Rodriguez that the sitaution would be different if a state
had denied education altogether to a particular class.
This remains my view.
Your draft appears to view the Fourteenth
Amendment as creating an expectation of public education.
As I am not sure where this would lead us, I need to
examine your language in this respect more carefully.

I

\~t '6J.I~~
as the source of anyri~~.

have not viewed the~ ~ t:ln

Thus, I would rest our holding squarely on the Equal
Protection Clause - though

emphasizing~ce of

education.
In weighing the state interests, you have
mentioned - and I would emphasize even further - the
insubstantiality of its asserted interest as compared with
the state's own interest in not creating a subclass of
illiterate persons many of whom may remain in Texas,

5.

adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare,
and crime.
Relatively Minor Points
(Copy p. 4 David's memo)
Your draft opinion is an impressive piece of
work, and I have enjoyed reading it.

I suppose all of us

prefer shorter and more narrowly focused opinions.

As

indicated above, the draft sweeps rather broadly, and
leaves me a little uneasy as to inferences that may be
drawn from it in other connections not clearly
foreseeable.
I will join your judgment, and hope that in the

1

>•~

drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be focused

so specifically on this uniquely discrete class that I can
join your opinion also.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan

lfp/ss 02/04/82
80-1538

Doe v. Plyler

Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment.
I join the judgment of the Court.

Although I

agree with a good deal of the Court's opinion, I do not
join it.

Perhaps understandably, the Court undertakes an

extensive analytical and historical justification of its
conclusion that the state's classification violates the
Equal Protection Clause.

Few provisions in the

Constitution have prompted as much diverse writing as this
clause, and perhaps no other provision presents comparable
difficulties of consistent analysis or in identifying
limiting principles.

I therefore think it advisable to

view this as the unique case that it is - one quite
without precedent.
The classification in question severely
disadvantages children who are the victims of a
combination of circumstances.

Access from Mexico into

this country, across our 2,000 mile border, is readily
available and virtually uncontrollable.

Illegal aliens

are attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps

2.

by other benefits as well.

This is a problem of serious

national proportions, as the Attorney General recently has
recognized.

See, ante, at ____

Perhaps because of the

intractability of the problem, Congress - vested by the
Constitution with the responsibility of protecting our
borders and legislating with respect to aliens - has not
provided effective leadership in dealing with this
problem.

It therefore is certain that illegal aliens will

continue to enter the United States and, as the record
makes clear, an unknown percentage of them will remain
here.

I agree with the Court that their children should

not be left on the streets uneducated.
Although the analogy is not perfect, our
decision today finds support in decisions of this Court
with respect to the status of illegitimates.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406

u.s.

In Weber v.

164, 175 (1972) we

said:" • • • visiting • • • condemnation on the head of an
infant" for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical,
unjust, and "contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some rleationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing."

3.

In this case, the state of Texas effectively
denies to the school age children of illegal aliens the
opportunity to attend the free public schools that the
state generally makes available to all residents.

They

are excluded only because of a status resulting from the
violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws
and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully.
The respondent children are innocent in this respect.
They could "affect neither their parents' conduct nor
their own status."

Trimble v. Gordon, 430

u.s.

462, 770

(1977).
Certainly, our review in a case such as this is
properly heightened.
U.S., at 767.

See Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 430

Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429

u.s.

190 (1976).

As Justice Frankfurter said, and as the Court has so often
repeated, "[c]hildren have a very special place in life
which law should reflect."
536

(1953).

May v. Anderson, 345

u.s.

528,

Our review must not be "toothless" when the

classification at issue deprives a group of children of
the opportunity for education afforded all other children
simply because they have been assigned a legal status due

~

~

4.

.~

JJ

to a violation of law by their parents.

A legislative

classification that threatens the creation of an
underclass of future citizens and residents strikes at one
of the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In these unique circumstances, the Court properly may
require that the state's interests be substantial and that
the means bear a "fair and substantial relation" to these
interests.

Cf. Royster Guano co. v. Virginia, 253

u.s.

412, 415 (1920).
In my view, the state's denial of education to
these children bears no substantial relation to any
substantial state interest.

Both of the district courts

found that an uncertain but significant percentage of
illegal alien children will remain in Texas as residents
and many eventually will become citizens.
by the Court, ante, at

The discussion

- - , of the state's purported

interests demonstrates that they are poorly served by the
educational exclusion.

Indeed, the interests relied upon

by the state seem insignificant in view of the
consequences to the state itself of wholly uneducated
persons living indefinitely within its borders.

By

5.

contrast, access to the public schools is made available
to the children of persons lawfully in this country
without regard to the temporary nature of residency in the
particular Texas school district.

The Court of Appeals

and the District Courts that addressed this case concluded
that the classification could not satisfy even the bare
requirements of rationality.

One need not go so far to

conclude that the exclusion of respondent's class of
children from state-provided education is a type of
punitive discrimination that is impermissible under
principles of fairness and equality before the law.
In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful
of what must be the exasperation of responsible citizens
and government authorities in Texas and other states
similarly situated.

Their responsibility, if any, for the

influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed by the
Constitution on the federal government.

So long as the

ease of entry remains inviting, and the right to deport is
exercised infrequently by the federal government, the
additional expense of admitting these children to public
schools might fairly be shared by the federal and state

6.

governments.

In any event, it hardly can be argued

rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within
our borders of a subclass of illiterate persons many of
whom will remain in the state, adding to the problems and
costs of both state and national governments attendent
upon unemployment, welfare and crime.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.

rtJ ~;.JS Y Jl~~

dfl 02/02/82
To: Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Justice Brennan's re-draft

(

s-~wcr!3r ~

~

'l-/2-/P"'2-- ~- +--

~ ~ ;-jz/IJ-)
I think that the re-draft of the pages on illegal

alienage as a suspect class may satisfy your concern.
this section is considerably changed;

The tone of

if anything, Justice Brennan

may be inviting some problems from Justice Marshall and Blackmun.

It

is a curious

situation that Justice Brennan

should be pointing out to you that your proposed method of deciding
the case is likely to have more ramifications than his.
may be right.
Thus,

But I am not sure that these effects can be avoided.

in his letter he suggests that

situated

I think he

geographically

in

a

state

if a group of children were
such

that

the

state

did

not

provide any "accessible" education to them, the Court might not use
strict scrutiny.

("So,

too,

a

'class'

of children geographically

situated in some remote corner of a state should perhaps not be able
to

command

the

distance.")

state

to

provide

a

school within

some

accessible

He expects that you would agree with the statement, and

perhaps you would.

But my reaction is just the reverse.

If a state

must provide some education to illegal aliens, then I think it must
provide

some

undertaken

to

education
provide

to

all

public

of

its

children

education

in

(assuming

the

first

it

has

place).

Otherwise, children are in a sense "disabled" by the fact of their

~

-

~ ~ A_~ .-#I! t~.-1 to

~i)~ ""~"'!~· 9~ ~ 4J
~~ ~ G/P ~~ ~hkt .

2.

citizenship and by the fact that their American parents have chosen
to

live

in

a

remote

corner

of

illegally across the boarder.

a

state--rather

than

scramble

But surely a society has a greater

obligation to its own members, than to persons, albeit children, who
are here illegally and perhaps not permanently.
Again,

I

would

think

that

deprives retarded children of an education,
protection--assuming

it

violates

equal

if

a

normal education
therefore

no

is

protection

is

to

entirely

The problem here

The argument would run that the

in effect useless

education

entirely

it would violate equal

deprive illegal alien children from an education.
would be defining a deprivation.

state

being

to

the

provided.

retarded child,
This

is

a

and

troubling

suggestion to accept but Justice Brennan's rebuttal that this mental
retardation is a "functional" distinction whereas "illegal alienage"
is a status distinction makes little sense to me.

Illegal aliens

they do not belong here, they have no

are functionally different:

right to vote or to work, to serve on juries or run for office.
In short,

I am not sure that Justice Brennan is

right that the Court ought to narrow its holding to illegal alien
children.

Certainly,

that

is

a

narrower

holding

than

just

"children" but I think it would be anomalous to favor illegal alien

~------------------children over any group of legal children.
Turning

to

the

place

of

education,

Justice

Brennan is understandably concerned that the Court not appear to be
pulling

education

out

of

the

air

as

a

protected

explains his attachment to the historical discussion.
this

is a

problem too

for

you.

He

is concerned

value.

This

I think that

that under

your

7

approach, AFDC, medical care, and the whole range of social welfare
services might have

to be provided as well--unless you can give a

constitutionally based explanation for why deprivation of education-as opposed

to deprivation of heat,

should be so favored.

food,

medical services, etc--

I don't know if this troubles you.

Perhaps

the historical explanation is acceptable even if it is not utterly
convincing.

The difficulty with

the case

is that any equal

protection decision--except one which finds illegal aliens to be a
suspect class or
right--tends
Children

are

your

s bstantive

favored

the

over

other

due

process

groups,

fundamental

flavor

education

to

over

it.
other

Perhaps this is defensible, but there is some tension

discussion

fundamental right.
on

right to some education to be a

to

necessities.
with

the

"innocent

illegitimacy cases

in

Rodriguez

as

to why

education

is

not

a

One solution for you would be to rest entirely
children"
and

the

point.

You

intermediate

could

standard of

rest

on

the

review.

The

problem would be whether you would be prepared to follow the same
approach in a case involving illegal alien children and some other
social service.

If you would be willing to treat the next case to

the same standard of review then I
that

the

service,

think you can simply say here

state cannot deprive some group of children of a social
for

reasons over which the children have no control.

--------------~----------~--------------------------

Of

course you would limit yourself to education in this case, but the
analogy

to

other

inconsistency.

social

services

would

not

threaten

you

with

4.

The

difficulty

with

analogy to illegitimacy is twofold.

resting

First,

entirely

the

illegal alien children

are somewhat differently situated than illegitimates.
are penalized for acts of their parents;

on

!!legitimates

illegal alien children are

penalized because they are not entitled to American citizenship, to
stay and work in the community, or

to vote.

Second,

to say that

when any group of children is deprived of some significant social
service,

the Court will

use

a

heightened

standard of

review, may

lead the Court down unforeseen paths in entirely different sorts of
cases.

But it may be perfectly reasonable to say that whenever any

group of children is completely denied or relatively deprived of a
significant
provided,

social

such

service,

that

when

the

same

these childrens will

services

are

generally

likely be disabled

from

entering the mainstream of life, then the Court must look harder at
the state's justifications.

Of course, there is no need to say all

of this in the current opinion, but I think you have to be prepared
to go down this line unless you can see a principled way to limiting
the

case

to

particular

combination

of

circumstances.

I

think

Justice Brennan has tried to limit the case rather sharply to its
particular

ingredients.

It

is paradoxical that

in

the process of

limiting the case, he suggests a mode of equal protection analysis
that is potentially sweeping.

But your approach may be subject to

the same criticism.
There must be some principled way to tell a state
that it cannot deprive a group of children of an education, but I am
still strugging for it.

,jttprtutt <lf!tltd !lf tlrt 'J:ni.ttb ,jtates
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February 2, 1982

Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934 -- Plyler v. Doe, Etc.
Dear Lewis,
Thank you very much for your thoughtful comments on
the draft. I'm very encouraged that it will not be difficult to find common ground because I tend to perceive
this case, and what would be the most appropriate opinion
for the Court, in very nearly the terms that you do. Although the opinion was purposefully "firmed up" with as
much support as possible, in order to bring to the fore
all the problems at work in this somewhat sui generis
case, I hoped not to wander very far afield in terms either of holding or reasoning. May I respond to your comments in turn.
Illegal Aliens as a Suspect Class
The proper level of scrutiny to be afforded state,
as opposed to federal, classifications directed against
"illegal aliens" is indeed a most difficult and perplexing problem. But there is no need to attempt to resolve
that problem in this case for, as you observe, we are
concerned here with a "uniquely postured" subclass of illegal aliens. In footnote 18, and again on p. 23, the
draft describes several factors suggesting that "illegal
aliens" should not be deemed a suspect class. In a similar vein, the final sentence of the crossover paragraph
on page 21, clearly suggests that "need" alone, would not
be enough to warrant heightened scrutiny. And in the
paragraph beginning on page 21, it is said that "persuasive arguments" can be made suggesting unusual state prerogatives with respect to the treatment of illegal aliens
generally.
The several sentences in the text, pp. 19-21, describing the several common elements between "illegal aliens"
and those classes heretofore deemed suspect, are intended
only to highlight the unique nature of the subclass of
"undocumented children." For example, there might well
be a difference between singling out illegal alien children as a group, and selecting out the class of retarded
children. The class of retarded children would not reflect a status-based distinction, near the core of equal
protection clause concern, but rather some functional
differentiation. So too, a "class" of children geographically situated in some remote corner of a state should

perhaps not be able to command the state to provide a
school within some accessible distance. In other ~ords, 7
perhaps not every subclass of children is necessar1ly
treated the same even with respect to the denial of education.
As you note, the draft does not suggest that even
the class of undocumented children are, in any circumstance other than the denial of education, necessarily
deserving of heightened scrutiny. Although concededly
the argument for "middle-level" scrutiny, across-theboard for such children is strong, isn't it best in this
case to preserve what might be the somewhat divergent positions of the Court with respect to undocumented children who claim, for example, the discriminatory denial of
~t~~elfare benefits--a very difficult problem if
heightened scrut i ny were to be afforded to the class .~
se. Thus, rather than prescribe a level of scrutiny,
e.g. Craig v. Boren, suitable for this class in all situations, would it not be more prudent merely to describe
the nature of the "uniquely discrete class" being discriminated against here. I do think that the discrete
nature of the class heightens for them the significance
of education.
In short, as the attached revised IliA excerpt indicates, would it satisfactorily address your concerns with
respect to the discussion of the discrimination, by
eliminating, or dropping to footnote, most of the back.,J.VJ._,
ground discussion on the class of "illegal aliens generally"? The considerations for, and against, heightened
scrutiny will then be on a more "equal footing." I am
hesitant about wholly omitting all discussion of the issue since it is clearly one of the central, and most difficult, issues posed by the case. But perhaps you might
suggest a way to abbreviate the discussion of this aspect
of the children's unique circumstance still more.

vd

Reliance on Education
The draft was intentionally constructed simply to
adopt the suggestion set forth in Rodriguez, and restated
in your note, that in terms of level of scrutiny, the absolute denial of education to particular classes of children warrants strict scrutiny. Although the congressional debates lend much support for the view, reflected
so frequently in our cases, that education is of special
importance within the framework of equality, there is
just no support in those debates, or in our cases, for ~Q
the idea that a state has any affirmative obligation to
establish a system of public education. That conclusion

is stated on page 33, and again on 34, supported by the
material in footnotes 23 and 28. Indeed, the legislative
material tends to support your Rodriguez view that the
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to provide a mechanism for reviewing school financing arrangements, or for
"finely tuning" equality in the type and quality of education provided. Please suggest any wording that you
think might better state these conclusions if you feel
that the slightly obscure statements presently in the
text are unsatisfactory. But, I do think it important
that the history also confirms our shared view that we
are to look closely on the absolute denial of education
to certain discrete groups of children. It is that confirmation that I wish to preserve; and then to make clear
that the group of undocumented children is precisely such
a discrete grup.
Relatively Minor Points
1. This point is very well taken. The concluding paragraph should be confined to the "within the jurisdiction"
question.
2. The final sentence of the first paragraph of fn. 15
will be deleted.
3. I am not sure that I see the relevance of washington
v. Davis here. The draft addresses only the types of
groups that have been held historically suspect; it does
not purport to create any shift in the showing required
when we are dealing with the impact of a facially neutral
statute. I will modify this language somewhat in the
next draft. Have you some wording to suggest.
I expect that we are approaching the point where I
should begin preparing a printed draft for circulation to
the Conference. But I would much appreciate your comments with respect to the proposed changes in the attached Part IIIA.
Sincerely,
Justice Powell
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens

A

Several formulations explain our treatment of certain
legislative classifications as "suspect."

Some classifications

are empirically more likely than others to reflect deep-seated
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective.

Legislation predicated on such prejudice

is well recognized as incompatible with the constitutional
understanding that each

~'

~s

to be judged individually, ~

and entitled to eq: al justice under the law.

Classifications treated as suspect tend also to be those that are
least likely to be relevant to any proper legislative goal.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379

u.s.

See

184, 192 (1964); Hirabayashi v.

United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).

Finally, certain groups,

indeed largely the same groups, have historically been "relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."
28

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,

(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); see

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.
4 (1938).

In affording rigorous scrutiny to classifications

adversely affecting "discrete and insular minorities"--relatively
small in number, identifiable by immutable or nearly immutable
personal attributes or status, habitually victimized--we afford
no judicial preference to their condition.
Nation has taught us that

~le

The experience of our
prejudice i

· ei

toa--

manifest itself in the legislature's treatment of some groups.
That experience is encapsulated in the Equal Protection Clause of

~~ zvJ,J.S!f
.,&~ df ~/z_

the Fourteenth Amendment.

Legislation imposing special

disabilities on such groups suggests precisely the kind of "class
or caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish.
Lax enforcement of the law barring entry into this country,
coupled with the refusal to create an effective bar to the
employment of illegal aliens, has resulted in the creation of a
substantial "shadow population" of illegal aliens within our
national boundaries. 1

The situation has evoked the specter of a

permanent ·caste of persons, encouraged to remain here as a source
of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. 2

Such

1 The Attorney General recently estimated the number of
illegal aliens within this country at between 3 and 6 million.
In presenting to both the Senate and House of Representatives
several presidential proposals for reform of the immigration
laws--including one to "legalize" many of the illegal entrants
currently residing in the United States by creating for them a
special status under the immigration laws--the Attorney General
noted that this subclass is largely composed of persons with a
permanent attachment to the nation, and that they are unlikely to
be displaced from our territory:
"We have neither the resources, the capablility, nor the
motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many
of whom have become, in effect, members of the community. By
granting limited legal status to the productive and law-abiding
members of this shadow population, we will recognize reality and
devote our enforcement resources to deterring future illegal
arrivals."
2 As the District Court observed in No. 80-1538, the
confluence of government policies has resulted in
"the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens, such
as the parents of plaintiffs in this case, whose presence is
tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are
virtually defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous
Footnote continued on next page.

a class would appear to display many of the characteristics of
those "discrete and insular" minorities for which the Equal
Protection Clause has historically offered a special solicitude. 3
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of this class of illegal inhabitants.

Persuasive

arguments suggest that state legislatures enjoy unusual
prerogatives with respect to persons whose presence within the
.
.
i.)L
.
b oundar1es of the Un1ted States hae been the product of the1r
·
Luu~ ..t.,..~
4
~·~f~ cond

'\

t.

These arguments do not apply with the same

neglect to which the state or the state's natural citizens and
business organizations may wish to subject them."
458 F. Supp.,
at 585.
3we need not labor over historical materials before
acknowledging that aliens have been "saddled with .••
disabilities, ..• subjected to ..• a history of unequal
treatment, ..• and relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."
San Antonio School Dist.,
supra, 411 U.S., at 28. Many of the reasons that have prompted
us to regard resident aliens as a "prime example of a discrete
and insular minority ... for whom ... heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate," Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S., at
372, apply with even greater force to illegal aliens. Lawfully
resident aliens may have some access to political forums, if only
in an advisory capacity, and may freely avail themselves of the
judicial process.
In contrast, illegal aliens are understandably
reluctant to risk exposure by bringing their complaints to the
attention of public agencies and law enforcement authorities,
whether those complaints are a direct result of discriminatory
treatment by virtue of immigration status, or arise from some
less invidious source. The class may indeed be in need of
protection. But need alone, without constitutional authority,
cannot suffice to warrant heightened judicial scrutiny.

~ ~;

e

9

4several factors _ ; t that "illegal aliens" should not be
deemed a "suspect cla
." Unlike most of the classifications
that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this class, by
virtue of entry into this country, is ~e~a~ the product of
voluntary action.
Indeed, entry into the class is itself a
Footnote continued on next page.

force to classifications imposing particular disabilities on the
children of such unlawful entrants.

Those who choose to enter

our territory by stealth and in violation of law might be asked
to bear the burden of legislation designed to deter their
unlawful entry. 5

The children of those persons are hardly

similarly situated.

Their "parents have the ability to conform

their conduct to societal norms," and indeed possess the power to
remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the State of Texas,

crime. In addition, it could hardly be suggested that the status
of "illegal alienage" is ~es~mf'o@oio~Y:y irrelevant to every
legislative action. With respect to the actions of the federal
government, alienage classifications may be intimately related to
the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal prerogative to
control access to the United States, and to the plenary federal
power to determine who has sufficiently manifested his allegiance
to become a citizen of the Nation. No State may independently
exercise a like power. But if the Federal Government has by
uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate
~+?
standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the states may,
of course, follow the federal direction. Nor are the states
~~ei~ without power to meet legitimate demographic and economic ~~
concerns arising from a potential influx of persons from outside
this country. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). We have no
need in this case to resolve the difficult problem that might be
presented by the application of equal protection standards to
state classifications based on illegal alienage generally, or
with respect to other state created rights. We hold only that in
the context of §21.03l's absolute denial of education to this
discrete class of undocumented children, strict scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review.
5 The courts below noted the ineffectiveness of the Texas
provision as a means of controlling the influx of illegal
entrants into the State. See 628 F. 2d, at 460-461; Doe v.
Plyler, 458 F. Supp., at 585; In re Alien Children Education
Litigation, 501 F. Supp., at 578 ("the evidence demonstrates that
undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free public
education. Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come
into this country seek employment opportunities and not education
benefits • • . . There was overwhelming evidence ... of the
unimportance of public education as a stimulus for
immigration.").

..

but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status."
Gordon, 430

u.s.

762, 770 (1977).

Trimble v.

Whatever efficacy the State

might find in attempting to reach the conduct of adults by acting
against their children, legislation directing the onus of
parent's misconduct on his children does not comport well with
our most fundamental conceptions of justice.
"[V]isiting • . • condemnation on the head of an infant
is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the ... child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his
birth and penalizing the .•. child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust--way of deterring the parent." Weber
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 u.s. 164, 175
(1972).
It surely cannot be said that undocumented status is
"constitutionally irrelevant

to~

proper legislative goal" of

~
~

the State of Texas. J -purther, the characteristic deemed decisiv

1~

-ft,~

under the Texas scheme, migration status, is not absolutely
immutable, since it is the product of conscious action.

These

considerations militate against affording illegal alienage a

)

h~ghtened scrutiny.

Nevertheless, immigr~tion status
is a

characteristic over which the undocumented children who are
plaintiffs in this case have little or no control.

~

Ji~~

a!L-tt
~~->
-~
~~

~~.,;,...
In addition, t

the classification at issue in the Texas scheme adversely targets
a discrete class exhibiting many of the characteristics of
''

powerlessness and vulnerability that have evoked special
solicitude.

The

rat ~ e

nature of this class cautions

against attempting to prescribe some standard of judicial review

that might be applied to it in all circumstances.

But it

suffices for the moment to acknowledge the presence of many of
the factors suggesting that legislation disabling this discrete
class of "undocumented children" is in the nature of "class or
caste" legislation with which the the Equal Protection Clause is
most emphatically concerned.

With these observations in mind, we

turn our attention to the state-created right to which these
children claim an equal entitlement.

.·

February 4, 1.982
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler v. Doe

Dear Bill:
I have agonized over this case more than a little ,
as the answer seems so clear to me and yet writing it out
creates various concerns - as we have agreed .
I am particularly grateful to you for affording
multiple opportunities to suggest changes in your first
draft. ~he revision of subpart A that accompanied your
letter of February ? is - I think - a substantial
clarification.

Yet, Bill, I have concluded that it is best for me
to write separately. My concern as to the •open endedness•
of equal protection prompts me to be extremely cautious in
this case as to the reach of the prPcedent we set. Although
you and I often have been together on equal protection
analysis (e.g., Murgial), we also have differed as we did in
Rodriguez.
This case is quite unique , and I have thought it
prudent to write less exhaustively than your opinion . I
recognize, of course, that your purpose also has been to
circumscribe our holding narrowl~ and perhaps you have done
this . Nevertheless, given my co~rns, I am presently
inclined to join only the judgment .
I have been \-JOrking all of this morning on a draft
of a concurring opinion. r am saying that I agree with much
of your opinion, but write to focus solely on the unique
status of these children.

Although we have not. heard from the three Brothers
who voted as we did, there should be a Court on the basts of
equal protection analysis - though my language will differ
somewhat from yours.
Sincerely ,

,Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

Fl~

J

lfp/ss 02/04/82
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 4, 1982

Plyler
You must have had little sleep last night to have
produced a draft opinion between 6:00p.m., when I departed,
and 8:30a.m., when I returned.

I do thank you, as it gave

me an opportunity to take a look before leaving this
afternoon.
As you will see from my revision, I rearranged the
order of the draft and added some of my own language.

I

will count on you to improve it.
I have left out of the text the reference to
strict scrutiny - generally the first page and a half of
your draft.
footnote.

The substance of that should go into a
With respect to strict scrutiny, despite WJB's

view that it narrows the "window" of precedent for future
cases, I continue to react negatively to expanding "suspect
classifications".

I am still open to discussion, however.

Unless you see some objection, I would like to add
a note dealing with "residency".
experience in Virginia.

I have in mind my own

No school district has any

obligation to admit children who do not reside within the
district.

Thus - looking across the line into Virginia -

2.

families living in King William County may not send their
kids to the excellent Fairfax schools without approval and
the payment of tuition.

I would think Texas properly could

require a de facto state of residence within the school
district.

Try your hand at a note to this effect.
I

should have mentioned above that

want to refer to Rodriguez, and

I

I

certainly

would mention that

I

left

open the question where children were excluded altogether.
I

will try to talk to Justice Brennan today,

advise him that I will concur separately, and say that I
should have a brief concurring opinion no later than the
first of next week.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 02/04/82
~>iEMORANDtJM

DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis v. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 4, 1982

Plyler
You must have had little sleep last night to have
produced a draft opinion between 6:00p.m., when I departed,
and 8:30a.m., when I returned.

I do thank you, as it gave

me an opportunitv to take a look before leaving this
afternoon.
As you will see from my revision, I rearranged the
order of the draft and added some of my own language.

I

will count on vou to improve i.t.
I have left out of the text the reference to
strict scrutiny - generally the first page and a half of
your draft.
footnote.

The substance of that should go into a
With respect to strict scrutinv, despite WJB's

view that it

narrm~s

the "window" of precee"ent for future

cases, I continue to react negatively to expanding "suspect
classifications".

I am still open to discussion, however.

Unless you see some obiecti.on, I would like to C'ldd
a note dealing

~"'ith

"residency".

experhmce in Virginia.

I have in mind my own

No school district has any

obligation to admit children who do not reside wi.thtn the
district.

Thus - looking across the line into Virginia -

2.

families living in King

~Hlliam

County may not send their

kids to the excellent Fairfax schools without approval and
the payment of tuition.

I woulo think Texas properly could

require a de facto state of residence within the school
district.

Try your hand at a note to thjs effect.
I

should have mentioneo above that

want to refer to Rodriguez, and

I

I

certainly

would mention that

I

left

open the question where children were excluded altogether.
I

will try to talk to Justice Brennan today,

advise him that

I

will concur separately, and say that t

should have a brief concurring opinion no later than the
first of next week.

T.J. F. P. , Jr •

ss

lfp/ss 02/08/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 8, 1982

80-1538 Pl}f).er
Thank you for adding a little "scholarship" to my
draft.

You did not follow my plea to improve the text.

Given the problem, I understand your restraint.
Comments that occur to me as I reread it this
morning are as follows:
1.

What do you think of the third sentence in the

first paragraph in the opinion?

Would it be better to omit

it, and say something along the following U .nes:
"As our precedents afford only limited
guidance, I think it advisable to rest our
decision squarely on the unique facts of this
case."
2.

As you state, fn. 2 is troublesome.

I have

tried reframing a few of the sentences as follows:
"The Court in Rooriluez was not faced with
the complete exclus on of a. group of children
from education, and it expressly reserved
this question. 411 u.s., at 36-37. The
rationale of the reservation was that a total
denial of education might violate a
fundamental right because some m:i.nimum of
education may be necessary to the exercise of
the franchise to vote and of First Amendment
rights. As indicated above, we need not
reach the question whether on this rationale
illegal alien children may claim a
'fundamental' right under the Constitution."

-

2.

I would like to work into the footnote at some
point that there is no constitutional guarantee of a right
to education any more than a guarantee that government must
provide food, shelter, utilities and other now customary
public services.

3.

Should we not say in a note that aliens who

violate immigration laws have not been held entitled to any
constitutional rights other than due process in any
proceedings brought against them?

I would like to make this

as strong as we properly can.
Although I use.!! the term "toothless" in Trimble, I
have never been enchanted by it.
appropriate word?

4.

Can you think of a more

If not, perhaps we should cite Trimble.

I note from the annual report of the Director

of the Administrative Office (p. A-17), that only 113
"deportation" civil cases were filed in fiscal 1981.
deportation a civil rather than a criminal matter?

Is
If in

fact there were only 113 deportation proceedings - whether
civil or criminal - filed in our entire country in 1981,
this seems worthy of a footnote.
inaction by the government.

It evidences the degree of

I must say that this number is

not easy to believe, and perhaps it is prudent to ask the
library to get in touch wi.th the Admi.nistrative Office for
clarification.

-

3.

In note 4, the fourth sentence (beginning with
"moreover" needs some amplifi.cation.

Why was the state able

to identify with certainty the aliens with permission to
work?
Also in fn. 4, revise the final long sentence as
follows:
"The Court does not address the question of
preemption in this case. If, however, a
state undertook to discriminate on the basis
of an alien's present or future status under
federal immigration laws, there would he a
serious question of preemption."
I

am not sure that

I

entirely understand the

thrust of the final sentence in the footnote.

5.

I have suggested changes in the language of

the last sentence in the paragraph that ends on page 7.
Perhaps it is best to rely solely on the Equal Protection
Clause.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 02/08/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Feb. 8, 1982

80-1538 Pl:t:ler
Thank you for adding a little "scholarship" to my
draft.

You did not follow my plea to improve the text.

Given the problem, I understand your restraint.
Comments that occur to me as I reread it this
morning are as follows:
1.

~~
What do you think of the third sentencefin the
~

first paragraph in the opinion?

Would it be better to omit

~I
~,

and say something along the following lines:
"As our preced~nts afford only limited
guidance, I think it advisable to rest our
decision squarely on the unique facts of this
case."
2.

As you state, fn. 2 is troublesome.

I have

tried reframing a few of the sentences as follows:
"The Court in Rodriguez was not faced with
the complete exc1us1on of a group of children
from education, and it expressly reserved
this question. 411 u.s., at 36-37. The
rationale of the reservation was that a total
denial of education might violate a
fundamental right because some minimum of
education may be necessary to the exercise of
the franchise to vote and of First Amendment
rights. As indicated above, we need not
reach the question whether on this rationale
illegal alien children may claim a
'fundamental' right under the Constitution."

2.

I would like to work into the footnote at some
point that there is no constitutional guarantee of a right
to education any more than a guarantee that government must
provide food, shelter, utilities and other now customary
public services.

3.

Should we not say in a note that aliens who

~ violate immigration laws have not been held entitled to any
constitutional rights other than due process in any
proceedings brought against them?
~

I would like to make this

as strong as we properly can.

~

Although I

use~

the term "toothless" in Trimble, I

have never been enchanted by it.
appropriate word?

4.

Can you think of a more

If not, perhaps we should cite Trimble.

I note from the annual report of the Director

the Administrative Office (p. A-17), that only 113
"deportation" civil cases were filed in fiscal 1981.
deportation a civil rather than a criminal matter?

Is
If in

fact there were only 113 deportation proceedings - whether
civil or criminal - filed in our entire country in 1981,
this seems worthy of a footnote.
inaction by the government.

It evidences the degree of

I must say that this number is

not easy to believe, and perhaps it is prudent to ask the
library to get in touch with the Administrative Office for
clarification.

3.

In note 4, the fourth sentence {beginning with
"moreover" needs some amplification.

Why was the state able

to identify with certainty the aliens with permission to
work?
Also in fn. 4, revise the final long sentence as
follows:
"The Court does not address the question of
preemption in this case. If, however, a
state undertook to discriminate on the basis
of an alien's present or future status under
federal immigration laws, there would be a
ser1ous question of preemption."
I am not sure that I entirely understand the
thrust of the final sentence in the footnote.

5.

I have suggested changes in the language of

the last sentence in the paragraph that ends on page 7.
Perhaps it is best to rely solely on the Equal Protection
Clause.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

dfl 2/8/82

To:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell
David
Your Concurrence in Doe v. Plyler

I hardly changed your text at all.

No. 80-1538

I did add the footnotes you

requested as well as two other "preemption" footnotes.
quite sure what you wanted to do with Rodriguez.

I was not

It is true that the

question of an absolute deprivation of education was reserved there.
If you wish to answer the question in this peculiar case then I suppose
you would go the strict scrutiny route, having found the violation of
a fundamental right.

I did not think you wished to go so far and in

footnote 2 I left the matter up in the air.
Footnotes 1 and 4 hint at the preemption problem without committing
you to any particular analysis.

I thought it fit rather nicely with

the point you were making in text.

But you need not humor me and I will

IJ;f

amxKx gladly take them out if you think it best.

John and Dick have both read through this draft.

I think it is fair

to say that they are both somewhat uneasy with "middle level" review--because
it tends to be so result-oriented and subjective--yet they seem to think,
as we do,that this is the best way to go at this case.
David
How was your trip?

.inpuntt <!fonrl of ffrt ~b ~hdtg
~Mlp:ttgUm. ~.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR.

Nos. 80-1538, 80-1934,

February

8, 1982

Plyler v. Doe

Dear Thurgood, Harry, Lewis and John,
Please note that this draft is substantially revised-and shorter than--from the preliminary circulation of February
3.

Thank you for your very helpful comments.

Sincerely,
/)

.

f~;Jj
I F

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackrnun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

'\

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 10, 1982
RE:

No. 80-1538
No. 80-1934

Plyler v. Doe
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Children

Dear Bill :
In due course I will undertake a dissent
Sincerely,

1n

,Jv~;/

(:

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

this case .

""' "'f'+C: -

-~

..-.........~ Uf

~~~..

~~"'

~as-fringLtn. gl. <!J. 2!lbi~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUST I CE

February 10, 1982

Re :

No . 80-1538
No . 80-1934

Plyler v . Doe
Texas v . Certain Named and Unnamed
Children

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
I will be writing a dissent ln this case .

Regards,

.

.§uprtutt

~tTurt

of tlp·

li;1i+:'~ f ,l.dt:.r

11T~5Jrtngton, ~· ~·

ZD2;•;3

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

February 11, 1982

No. 80-1538
No. 80-1934

Plyler v. Doe
Texas v. Certain Named and
Unnamed Children

Dear Bill,
I am doing additional work on these
significant cases and will wait for the additional
writing which is forthcoming before deciding what
action to take.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

.§u.prtttU <!fomt of tqt~b .§taftg
..asqmg-htn.. 'l9. <!f. 2.0,?'!~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 26, 1982

Re:

(80-1538

Flyer v. Doe

(

(80-1934 - Texas, etc.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

In light of the present state of these cases,
I submit the attached as a memo of my views.
In due course, something along these lines will
evolve into
dissenting opinion, reinforced by
any suggestions that may be forthcoming.

a

Regards,

~upr.ctn.c ~rmrt

af tq.c 1ltnif.cb .;§ta b.S'

2llasqingtott, ~. <q.

2llgi'!-~

C HAMBERS OF

.JU S TI CE S AN D RA DAY O ' CON N O R

March 8, 1982

80-1538
80-1934

Plyler v. Doe
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed
Undocume nt e d Alien Children

De ar Chief,

.

Your me mo in the refe renced cases is very
persua sive.
I have only some minor suggestions
which I will pass along.
I expect to join the
dissent .

,

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Confe r e nce

~u.vrtme <!fou.rt

of tlft Jlnittb ~tattg

Jf~fringtcn.lB.

QJ.

2LJ.;lJ.1~

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.

February 8, 1982

Dear Lewis,
I believe my revisionsA from Part III
on, effectively preserve, and support, your
Rodriguez views.

Sincerely,

.:§uprtmt

<!fourt of tfrt 'Jllnittb .:§tatts

'lllaslyingfott,

til. cq.

20p'-1~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 10, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1538 - Plyler, Superindendent v. Doe
No. 80-1934 - Texas v. Certain Named and
Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children

Dear Bill:
I agree with almost all of what Harry has in
his note of March 10.
Sincerely,

TirlT.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

~uprtmt (!Jcurl cf Up·~Htlt :§tmt.tr

2lfcrgJring-Lrtt, ~. <!J.

20~){.~

CH AM BE R S OF"

JUSTICE JOHN P AUL S T EVE N S

March 10, 1982

Re:

80-1538 - Plyer v. Doe
80-1934 - Texas v. Certain Named and
Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children

Dear Bill:
Harry's letter prompts me to add these comments.

!

In my opinion there are several different lines of
legal analysis that require the result that you reach in
your circulating opinion. For that reason, I am reasonably
sure that any draft that is acceptable to you and to Lewis
will be one that I will be able to join. I agree completely
with Harry's suggestion that it is extremely important to
obtain a Court opinion if that is at all possible.
I could
join a disposition based either on the premise that some
modicum of education is "fundamental" or on the premise that
the discrimination disclosed by this record violates the
rational basis standard as formulated in Royster v. Guano.
I agree with Harry that the reference to illegal aliens as a
suspect class could well be deleted from the opinion, but I
tend to disagree with his disapproval of the analogy of
illegal alien children to illegitimates; it seems to me that
that analogy is an effective response to some of the
argument made in the Chief's draft dissenting opinion.
This is dictated rather hastily because I have not reexamined the circulations since receiving Harry's letter,
but I thought I would let you know how important I think it
is that we obtain a Court opinion if that can be done.
Respectfully,
Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell

//l

dfl 03/11/82
To: Justice Powell
From:

David
Doe v. Plyler--No. 80-1538; 80-1934

Re:

J ~ ~ ~9-{ '!/'£AAA

Justice
these

cases

understand

in

the

Blackmun

hope

of

circulate~
·'c

has

putting

together

a

a

proposal

court.

As

in
I

it, Justice Blackmun proposes that the opinion rest on

the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection analysis.

The

Court would hold that some modicum of education is fundamental "to
preserve

rights

process,

and

of

expression

therefore

to

and

preserve

participation

in

the

individual

rights

political

generally."

Anticipating the Chief's attack, Justice Blackmun, in line with our
footnote

5,

notes

that

some

of

these

children

will

remain

here

permanently.

If the clerk gossip is worth anything,

I gather

that Justice Brennan is prepared to adopt this approach if it will
attract

your

demonstrate

vote.
that

He

will

education

rely
is

on

the

special.

historical
He

will

section

rely

on

to
the

illegitimacy/innocent children analogy to argue that the Court ought
not to assume that Congress would support the discrimination in this
case.
to

the

Justice Marshall has circulated a note stating that he agrees
proposal.

~

agreement,

Justice

Stevens

although he would

has

said

that

he

is

in basic

like to keep in some analogy to the

illegitimacy cases as a reason for raising the standard of review.

2

answer to

He believes that the illegitimate analogy
some of the Chief's arguments.

0

v.

Otherwise

Guano type of concurrence. Justice Blackmun also indicates that he
will

write

a

concurrence

on

preemption

along

the

lines

of

your

footnote 5 (although he does not give us a shred of credit.).

I

have also

looked over the Chief's dissent

in

more detail.

I make the following comments.

1.
of a fresh eye,

I

On re-reading your concurrence with something

find that it is still quite persuasive.

As you

know, I am much less comfortable with equal protection in this area
than with preemption.
to me.

But

approach,
conception.

if

then

the
I

The equal protection analysis seems "made up"
Court

think

is

going

you

have

adopt

to
hit

on

an
the

equal

protection

least

damaging

The Justices seem to feel that an opinion for the

cour~

is important in this case, possibly because the opinion will be so
heavily criticized, even resisted.

But I do not think you should be

quickly put off from what you have written.

And it is not clear to

me that an opinion for the Court is even desirable in this case.

2.

----

your

position,

response.

Nor

do

I

think

that

the Chief has

damaged

although -------~--------------------we may wish to make some changes

in

His sharpest attack on your position comes at page 4 and

footnote 4, and footnote 5. His attack is twofold.

~

First, he makes

j.

the

obvious

point

situation of
are

these

illegitirnates.

different

example.

that

from

children

perfect~

not

in

the

precise

These children--unlike illegitimates--

other

children.

They

The Chief's point is correct.

analogy is

are

may

be

deported,

for

We do not pretend that the

indeed, we say that it is not.

But I think the

"rough" analogy still holds.
Second,
distinguished

Rodriguez:

the

Chief

Why were

argues

that

the

children

not

you

have

not

in Rodriguez

penalized by their parents' decision to live in a poor county than a
wealthy one.?
attack.

One

I think that there are two possible answers to this
is

to adopt

the

line Justice Blackrnun suggests.

If

there is a fundamental right to some modicum of education, then this
case

is

defense,

different
then

I

from

think

Rodriguez.
you

are

If

corning

you
so

adopt

close

this

to

the

line

of

Blackrnun

proposal that you should consider joining an opinion redrafted along
the

lines

he

suggests--perhaps

retaining

the

analogy

to

the

illegitimacy cases as Justice Stevens recommends.
A second
that

the

children

-

st igrnat i zed.

line of defense--and one

--------~--'-----~

in

Rodriguez

were

not

There were many levels of

being

I

prefer--is

penalized

or

funding across the state.

No group of children was specially singled out for worse treatment.
By contrast, here we have a group of children who are wholly denied
a significant social service provided in full to all other children.
I believe that this second approach fully answers the Chief.
The
different

from

concurrence.

one

two

another,

responses
and

will

to

the

change

If you say that the reason

the

Chief

are

holding

of

quite
your

intermediate scrutiny is

justified is that these are innocent children who have been utterly
denied an education,

then the denial of education becomes part of

the reason for elevating the level of scrutiny.

You might reach a

different result--and probably would--if instead of education it was
free medical care.
alien

children

You might reach a different result, too, if the

were

provided

"some

modicum"

of

education--e.g.

morning classes.
More in line with the way the concurrence is now
written, is the second approach.
the

standard

of

review

is

stigmatized and penalized.

Here the only reason for elevating

that

a

group

case

any

counselling.
cases.

children

are

being

Of course, it matters that is education

rather than ice cream that is at stake.
the

of

differently

if

it

were

But you would not decide
medical

care

or

drug

Perhaps it is helpful to think of the right to travel

In those cases the Court holds that the right may not be

"penalized."

A penalty is something like a denial of education or

health care.

But the denial of education or health care is not the

source of the heightened scrutiny in those cases.

Rather it is the

right to travel plus some significant burden placed upon it.
In
position

that

some

constitutional right.
treated

short,
modicum

in

the
of

one

approach

education

is

you
a

take

the

fundamental

In the other approach, denial of education is

like the denial of any other important benefit--it is not

given special constitutional status--and the reason for raising the
standard of review is that a group of children is being stigmatized
and penalized by the denial of a significant benefit for the sins of
their elders.

5.

3.
responses

to

the

As I have indicated,

Chief--and

by

response

I

think your choice of

I

am

not

thinking

of

anything more than a few sentences--is essentially the same question
as whether or not you should agree to the Blackmun proposal.
My

own

sense

is

that

opinion that creates a new fundamental
question was left open in Rodriguez.

you

right.

should
I

not

join

realize that the

Yet I think it would be odd to

find a fundamental right to education for illegal aliens.
it is not indefensible.

an

Perhaps

But it is a big step, and this would seem

to be the last case in which the Court ought to take it.

Only with

some strain can it be argued that the state must educate all illegal
alien children because some of them may eventually become citizens
and take part in the political process.

To find a fundamental right

to

case

some

modicum

consequences

of

education

in other

undoing of Rodriquez.

in

cases •

I

this

am not

may

have

sure that

it

significant

is not the

Nor will such an opinion help with the next

case in which illegal alien children complain that they are denied
welfare or some other significant benefit.
that Justice Brennan's history

Finally, the one thing

section seems

to show

is that the

states were under no affirmative duty to provide any education.

How

can this be reconciled with Justice Blackmun's proposal?
In

sum,

although

it

recommend against the Blackmun proposal.
a new fundamental right to answer
sense

to

argue

that

illegal

alien

can

be

argued,

I

would

You do not need to create

the Chief.
children

It stretches common
are

entitled

to

some

modicum of education because they may some day be permitted to take
part in the political process.

t 'f"-<-

6.

I think you should stick to your guns.

5.

I have two final comments.

Justice Blackmun supports a preemption approach!
that

one

could

write

an

opinion

holding

that

irrational under the equal protection clause.
since

some

significant

percentage

of

First note that
Second,

I

the Texas

think

law was

One would argue that

illegal

alien

children

are

likely to stay in Texas and the country, they are no different than
all the other children--citizens and legal aliens--who may or may
not stay in Texas.
is

like

Choosing to educate one group and not the other

choosing

to

educate

people

on

a

random

basis.

Or,

following Justice Stevens suggestion that Royster v. Guano sets the
proper

standard,

I

suppose

one

could

point

to

the

huge

social

problem the state is creating in order to save what appears to be
very little money.

I fear that this, too, may be too sweeping and

may make it difficult for the states to discriminate against adult
aliens in other areas.

--

But I think it would be preferable to decide

the case on this rational basis or rational "with bite" basis than
create a new fundamental right.
if

y~-;~-·· at

need

not

all

bother

-p~aded.
with

This could be a counter suggestion
By using

standards

fundamental rights and the rest.

of

rati= ~

rev1ew,

suspect

the Court
classes,

But I am not sure that it works.

I

;§iuprtmt <qmui of t~t ~ttilil) ~faftg

2)tlr cur fri:n-gt on. lB. <q. 20gtJ!. ~
March 10, 1982

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACK!v1UN

Re:

No. 80-1538 No. 80-1934

Dear Bill:
I have been able novl to spend some additional time on these
difficult and very important cases.
You have done much work in
the preparation of your initial circulation of January 25 and
of the revised printed draft sent around on February 8.
You will recall that at conference my expressed ~reference
wa...,s fo..r r:,re-emption rather than equal protection, but that
bec-a"Use no one eiSe was similarly inclined, I perhaps would
have to go along with the equal protection approach.
I am
still inclined to favor pre-emption, primarily for the reason
that ~ equal protection route seems to encounter analytical
difficulties.
Thus, even though I join an equal protection
opinion, I may also write in separate concurrence a brief preemptio n paragraph or two.
I would be prepared generally to join your opinion, but I
refrain from doing so at this point because I think it is desirable, if at all possible, to have a Court opinion, as well
as a Court judgment.
As I read Lewis' separate writing, he
would not join the opinion as it is presently structured.
I~
realize that I am presumptuous in this, but I offer the follow
ing in the faint hope that it might have some appeal for Lewis
as well as for you:

squa~ ~traditional

Could we address the case
equal
protection fundamental rights_ter~s.
In Rodriguez , the Court
left open the qtreS'ti:tm.. wl'l'effier some modicum of education is
"fundamental."
I could answer that question in the affirmative, reasoning that some education is necessary to preserve
rights of expression and participation in the political
process, and therefore to preserve individual rights generally.
The Chief and those who join him, of course, will object that
illegal aliens have no individual rights to preserve.
My
answer to that objection possesses, I suppose, pre-emption
overtones.
The class of "illegal aliens" is a poorly defined
one; the District Court found that a substantial percentage of
the children involved in this case in fact will reside here ~

Page 2.

permanently, and that many are not presently deportable.
The
way in wnich the immigration laws are set up makes it impossible for the State ever to be sure which children will be deported or are deportable.
Thus, eveJ:-¥ child has a "right" to
be here until he actually is place
a 10n order,
n
ever
p o
e 1rnrn1 r
1on process a
ederal
otficial still has the discretion to allow the child to remain
in the United States.
Many of these children, therefore,
have, or will have, political and related rights, and there is
no way for the State to determine which children do not have
such rights.
Once it is gran ted that some quan turn of education is fundamental in a constitutional sense, the State cannot
deprive the entire group of the right to attend school.
If
such an approach to the case is taken, one could delete the
reference to illegal aliens as a suspect class and, also, the
analogy of illegal alien children to illegitirnates; neither of
these will then be necessary.
In short, one could say that the reason education is fundamental is that it is preservative of other rights.
The reason
that it is fundamental to this group is that some of these
children will be here permanently.
And it is for the Fedeial
Government, rather than the States, to determine which children
will be allowed to remain in the United States.
I doubt whether the adoption of this approach would require
much rewriting.
Your historical analysis still could be used
to indicate the importance placed on education by the Framers,
as well as their judgment that education is essential to preserve other rights.
The following comments are secondary, and are offered for
your consideration:
l.
I am mildly concerned about
ting the Arredondo case
in footnote 29 on page 31.
I belie e that certiorari is pending in that case, and I suspect
is likely th t the case will
be GVRed in the light of Plyler
2.
On page 34, near the center
is the statement that the record is clear "that
most, of the
undocumented children ... are likely
this country."
Does this square with the o ervation by the District
Court in the Alien Children's case,
SOl F. Supp., at 558, that
the evidence "demonstrates that
proximately ten percent of
the undocumented persons
country will remain here as
permanent settlers"?

7
·

Page 3.

3.
The first few words of the paragraph beginning at the
bottom of page 15 jar me a little.
I suppose that the Federal
Government is to blame, but the problem now is almost intractable. Would it be better to say "Sheer incapability or lax enforcement .•.
" This might be a little kinder to immigration
officials.
4. Would it be well to eliminate the last two sentences of
footnote 17 on page 17. Lewis is uncomfortable with this.
See
note 2 of his opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
cc:

Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens

.ittp:l-ttttt <!fourl of flrt ~tb ,jta±ts
j•ht$fringhrn. ~. <!J. 2LT~J.t.~
CHAMBERS O F

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

March 12, 1982

80-1538 Plyler

Dear Harry:
Your letter of March 10 to Bill Brennan - that I
was not able to think about carefully until today - is
helpful. It at least prompted me to reexamine my position.
This is a perplexing case for me because, although
I am clear that our decision is correct, it is not easy to
identify the controlling principle. As you say, the case
does not fit neatly into prior equal protection analysis.
Nor does preemption fit comfortably. I mention it in my
opinion (see fn. 5, p. 6, my opinion), but concluded it
would be stretching that doctrine too far.
You suggest the possibility of agreeing on a
•fundamental right to education• analysis. In Rodriquez, I
left open the question whether a denial of all education
would violate such a right. At the time the Constitution
was adopted, it was not contemplated that free public school
education was a fundamental right that every state had to
recognize. As important as education has been in the life
of my family for three generations, I would hesitate before
creating another heretofore unidentified right.
I am inclined to agree with John that the
preferable equal protection approach is quite simply that
what Texas is doing is irrational. Texas is penalizing
these children. The asserted state interest (expense of
educating them) is insubstantial as compared with the
eventual cost to the state of dealing with the serious
problems that will result from the alien children who will
remain in the state without even a grade school education.
Although there is no complete analogy in our cases, I agree
with John that the illegitimacy cases lend substantial
support. The children there also were penalized and
stigmatized.

2.

The Chief Justice •takes out• after my opinion
with some vigor. He inquires whether I would reach a
different result if children in a poor county complained
that they were being discriminated against becuase their
parents were living there rather than in a wealthy county.
My answer to the Chief will be that such children are not
stigmatized or singled out for this •penalty•. Our system
since the beginning of free public education, has been to
keep it in the hands of local communities, close to the
homes and families of the children. In the beginning,
localities bore the major financial burden of educating
resident children. In recent years, however, the political
process itself has tended to eliminate the locality
disparity by supplemental state funding. The federal
government also is now assisting in this process. This is
our system.
As I have often emphasized the importance of
•court opinions•, it may seem strange for me to say that at
least one can argue that Court agreement on analysis in this
case may not be as compelling as in some other situations.
The very fact that we have not identified any prior case, or
even any established principle, that controls this unique
case suggests that the precedential force of a judgment
alone will not be great. This will leave the Court free to
meet unforeseeable situations without being bound by a
decision tailored to redress a peculiar and unprecedented
type of injustice. This, of course, is not to say that a
Court opinion in this case would be undesirable.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens

.Jnprtntt <!fqurt qf tfrt ~ta ~htttg
,rulp:nght~ ~.
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CHA M B ER S O F

April 5, 1982

J USTI C E WM , J . BRENNAN, JR.

Nos.

80-153~,

80-1934 -- Plyler v. Doe, Etc.

Dear Lewis,
As you know, I am most anxious to have your join on an
opinion for the Court . The first twelve pages of the
present draft are essentially unchanged, with the exception of a reformulation of the question presented. Part
III, on the other hand, is much revised and substantially
abbreviated. The somewhat more "measured" response to
the equal protection problem outlined in your draft
concurrence--which I have largely incorporated--no longer
required any lengthy discussion of legislative material
or any complex analytic framework. But I do continue to
think that it is important to explain clearly why the
Texas approach is unreasonable as a matter of established
constitutional principle, and not merely an idiosyncratic
policy judgment on our part.
The draft is extended in one respect . I agree with
you that this case cannot be resolved on preemption
grounds. But I believe Harry is correct about the importance of preemption concerns in this respect: The Chief
takes the view in his memorandum that undocumented status, without more, carries with it a State prerogative to
deny these children an education. I think this assertion
rests, at heart, on the implications of federal law~ but
whatever weight the predominantly federal interests at
stake in the treatment of aliens may have in other contexts , it does not support the State's action here.
Hence, Part IV . In addition , while I thought it inappropriate in a Court opinion to take Congress to task for
its failures in this field , Part IV does offer an opportunity to emphasize Congress ' pre-eminent authority--and
to suggest that while at present we must muddle through
these questions as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment law,
we would much prefer to hear from Congress .

s/CJ
W. J . B. , ,Jr.
Justice Powell

March 12, 1<:'82

80-1538 Plyler

Dear Harry:
Your letter of March 10 to Bill Brennan - that I
was not able to think about carefullY until today - is
helpful. It ~t least prompted me to reexamine my position.
This is a perplexing case for me because, although
I am clear that our decision is correct, it is not easy to
identify the controlling principle. As you say, the case
does not fit neatly into prior equal protection analysis.
Nor does preemption fit comfortably. I mention it in my
opinion (see fn. 5, p. 6, my opinion), but concluded it
would be stretching that doctrine too far.
You suggest the possibility of agreeing on a
"fundamental right to education" analysis. In Rodriquez, I
left open the question whether a denial of all education
would violate such a right. At the time the Constitution
was adopted, it was not contemplated that free public school
education was a fundamental right that every state had to
recognize. As important as education has been in the life
of my family for. three generations, I would hesitate before
creating another heretofore unidentified right.
I am inclined to agree with John that the
preferable equal protection approach is quite si.mply that
what Texas is doing is irrational. Texas is 'enalizing
these children. The asserted state interestexpense of
educating them) is insubstantial as compared with the
eventual cost to the state of dealing with the serious
problems that will result from the alien children who will
remain in the state without even a grade school education.
Although there i.s no complete analogy in our cases, I agree
with John that the illegitimacy cases lend substantial
support. The children there also were penalized and
stigmatized.

2.

The Chief Justlce "takes out" after my opinion
with some vigor. He inquires whether I would reach a
different result if children i.n a poor county complained
that they were being disc r iminated against becuase their
parents were living there rather than in a wealthy county.
My answer to the Chief will be that such children are not
stigmatized or singled out for this "penalty". Our system
since the beginning of free public education, has been to
keep it in the hand s of local communities, close to the
homes and families of the children. In the beginning,
localities bore the major financial burden of educating
resident children. tn recent years, however, the political
process itself has tended to eliminate the locality
disparity by supplemental state funcHnq. The federal
government also is now assisting in this process. 'T'hi.s is
our system.
~s T have oftP.n emphasized the importance of
"Court opi.ni.ons", it may seem strange for me to say that at
least one can argue that Court agreement on analysis in this
case may not be as compe11:f.nq as in some other situations.
The very fact that we have not identtfied any prior case, or
even any established principle, that controls this unique
case suggests that the precedential force of a iudgment
alone will not be great. This will leave the Court free to
meet unforeseeahle situations without beinq bound by a
decision tailored to redres~ a peculiar and unprecedented
type of injustice. This, of course, is not to say that a
Court opinion in this case would be undesirable.

Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

Justice Brennan
\Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens
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derclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that
prides itself on adherence to sg:a.Btaf'iafl principle~ 19
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support
the view that a State may withhold its benificence from those
whose very presence within the United States is the product
of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities
on theJ.children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those
who e1~ct to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of
our law might-be-asked-to-bear-the -burden-of-legislation-<ksigned_to_deter__their--lmla.wful--entry. But the children of
those illegal entrants are not comparably situated. Their
"parents have the ability to conform their conduct to societal
norms," and presumably the wher-e-wit-hal to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the children who are
plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S.
762, 770 (1977). Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by acting against their children,
legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against
his children does not comport with fundamental conceptions
of justice.

~

~~

~
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~
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ernment policies has resulted in
"the e:Gstence of a large number of employed illegal aliens, such as the parents of plaintiffs in this case, whose presence is tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are virtually defenseless against
any abuse, exploitation, or callous neglect to which the state or the state's
natural citizens and business organizations may wish to subject them."
458 F. Supp., at 585.
~ we neednor1lilior overnisloricaJ- matenalSbefore acK.n6Wl~
dging that aliens have been "saddled with such disabilities," "subjected to
uch a history of unequal treatment," and "relegated to such a position of
olitical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
rnajoritarian political process," San Antonio School District, su a, 411
-- c:;-at-£8, we reject the claim that "illegal aliens" are a "suspect class.,,._,

~

Antonio school District, nor any other case in
ass, was addressing the status
which we have defined a suspec t Cl
of persons unlawfully in our country.

------------------~
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April 7, 1982
80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler

Dear

~il1:

"rhank you for your letter of April 5, enclosing a
C0PY of your second draft in this important case.

This is a fine draft, and I am grateful to you for
makinq this substantial effort to accommodate mv thinking
~bout this case - in the commendable interest of musterinq a
Court.
I enclose a xerox copy of paqe 16, on which I have
suggested minor language changes that I would apor~ciate
your constderinq.

As you will note, these chanqe~ reflect my
stronglv held conviction that an adult illegal alien is here
in willful violation of our laws, and ~houl~ be so viewed.
Aliens, includinq some perhaps who are here illeqally, have
become patriotic ano constructive Aroericans. Also, I share
- and applaud - your sympathy for peoples all over the world
who woulo like nothing better than to live in our country.
But this understandable desire is no justification for
violating our laws. I add, parenthetically, that T wish a
good many of our own citizens, who seem to make a career out
of criticizing the United States, were more appreciative of
the privilege of living in this wonderous land of freedom
and comparative plenty.
In addition to the changes I propose in the text
on paqe 16, I suqgest a modification of fn. 19. The
language that I used in Rodriguez di..-:t not embrace illegal
aliens.
I appreciate, Bill, that my concerns are addressed
only to a very minor portion of your well written revised
op1n1on. ~or will these change~ affect your analysis or the
force of your opinion. They will, however, make me feel
more comfortable about joininq it.

r may retain some portions of my brief
concurring opinion that will reinforce rather than detract
in any way from what you have written so well.
With appreciation.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan
Jfp/ss

.:§npuuu <!Juurluf fltt ~hl .:§hrltl"f
~a;!;l'.fri:n.g!un,
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 8, 1982

Re:

80-1538 and 80-1934 - Plyler
v. Doe

Dear Bill :
Please join me .
Respectfully ,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

April 8, 1982

80-1538, 80-1934 Plyler v. Doe

Dear Bill:
Please ioin me.
Sincerelv,

;rust ice Brennan

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.Ju.prtmt C4onrt of tlft ~~ i\tatts
:Jfas4htghtn. ~. (!}. 2llp~~
C HAMBE R S OF"

TH E C HI EF .JU STICE

April 9, 1982
Re:

No.

(80-1538 - Plyler v. Doe
(80-1934 - Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed,
Undocumented Alien Children

Dear Lewis:
I am profoundly troubled by the developments in this case
and of course will not join it as it stands . What limiting
principle can confine this massive expansion of the Fourteenth
Amendment to "persons " simply on the basis of their age . If the
Fourteenth Amendment covers minor children who are illegally in
the country , how can this Court rationally confine the holding so
that the parents will not be treated as "persons " for purposes of
the whole spectrum of welfare benefits as in Thompson v . Shapiro?
I have looked for and found no case in which there can be
a basis for limiting the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of
age . If anyone can point to something along this line it is
possible that I could reconsider my position .

Justice Powell

.:§tt;rrtmt <!fourt of tqt ~b .:§tatts

'IDnsqmgton, lJ. <!f. 2!Jp)l.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 14, 1982

Re:

Nos. 80-1538 and 80-1934 - Plyler v. Doe

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

d'fM. .
•
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

dfl 06/03/82
To: Justice Powell
From: David
Re:
The Chief's redraft of his dissent in Plyler:
1538

NO.

80-

The Chief makes some good points, most of which we
have seen, and he keeps you in his sights.

The only attack on you that you may wish to respond
to

is

the

Chief's

repeated

statement

that

singled out education for special treatment.

the

Court

has

He says this at

page 4, note 3, and again in text at pages 7-8.

It would be

easy enough to add a footnote or phrase to the text of your
~~

r----__.__ _ _..

concurrence making

it clear that you view education like any

other important governmental benefit and that your vote would
be no different

if those benefits were at issue.

Since the

case at hand only concerns education you may not wish to do
this.

Yet in view of Justice Blackmun's concurrence and the

prominence

given

to

education

in

useful to add such a statement.
you

to

a

somewhat

broader

view

the

opinion,

it might

be

Of course, that does commit
than

the

opinion

takes--

although it cannot be doubted that the majority justices would
vote

the

same

than education.

way

if

the question was

innoculations

rather

2.

If you would like a phrase or footnote added to your
concurrence, I can take care of it, as well as any other final
changes.

.§uprtmt Qfltltrt ttf tqt ~nitt~ .§tait.ll'
Jla,s-ltington, gl. (!f. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

June 4, 1982

Re :

8 0 -15 3 8 )

80-1934)

Plyler v. Doe
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed
Undocumented Alien Children

Dear Chief,
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

<!ftttttittf tqt ~tb j;taftg
._ru;!p:ttgtlllt. ~. <!f. 211~-'1~

j;u:prtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 4, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1538
No. 80-1934

Plyler v. Doe
Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed
Children

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

{,~
The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

~tt:pt"ttttt

<!JGurf llf tlrt 'Jlini!tb ~taft.&'
~fringhm. ~. <!J. 20 bfJl.~

C HAM BE R S OF

June 7 1 1982

.JU ST ICE BYRON R . WH ITE

Re:

80-1538 and 80-1934 Plyler v. Doe, and
Texas v. Certain Named and
Unnamed Undocumented Alien
Children

Dear Chief,
Please

add my name

to your

this case.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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